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[687] 
Internal Jus ad Bellum 
Eliav Lieblich* 
In 1945, the United Nations Charter famously set out “to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war.” Having in mind traditional interstate wars, the Charter’s 
Article 2(4) outlawed, for the first time, interstate uses of force. However, nowadays, 
international wars are relatively rare, while civil wars are both more numerous and 
increasingly destructive. Still, international law has yet to develop a regime regulating the 
resort to war (jus ad bellum) within a state, either by governments or opposition groups. 
Contemporary jus ad bellum, thus, fails to address one of the most atrocious forms of 
war in the modern international system. 
 
This Article puts forward a novel theory of internal jus ad bellum, equally applicable to 
governments as well as opposition groups. It demonstrates that the current blind spot in 
international law concerning this issue is incoherent and unwarranted. By applying the 
revisionist approach to just war theory, this Article argues that internal resort to armed 
force can only be morally acceptable if undertaken in self (or other) defense against grave 
threats. 
 
Applying this notion to the international legal sphere, this Article claims that collectivist 
doctrines such as self-determination, sovereignty, or democratic entitlement are not 
appropriate venues for an acceptable standard of internal jus ad bellum. It proceeds to 
locate such a possible standard in international human rights law (“IHRL”), which 
enshrines everyone’s right to life. However, as the Article demonstrates, IHRL, as 
currently understood, fails to serve as an effective framework for internal jus ad bellum, 
since it collapses, during armed conflict, into international humanitarian law. The Article 
concludes by suggesting an understanding of IHRL that can overcome these limitations 
and thus serve as a working doctrine of internal jus ad bellum.  
 
 * Assistant Professor, Radzyner Law School, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya. J.S.D., 
Columbia Law School. I wish to thank Eyal Benvenisti, Janina Dill, and Adam Shinar for the helpful 
comments and discussions, and the editors at Hastings Law Journal for their diligent work. 
Lieblich-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:20 PM 
688 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:687 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 689 
I.  External and Internal JUS AD BELLUM in International Law ....... 696 
A.  Positive Unification: Natural Law Regulating All 
Realms of Force ....................................................................... 696 
B.  From Negative Unification to Doctrinal Divergence ..... 700 
C.  A Critique of Doctrinal Divergence .................................. 704 
II.  A Revisionist Approach Toward Internal JUS AD BELLUM ............ 707 
A.  Revisionist Just War Theory and Internal Resort to 
Hostilities ................................................................................. 707 
B.  Reductive Individualism and the Self-Defense 
Standard ................................................................................... 710 
III.  Collectivist Visions of Internal JUS AD BELLUM ............................ 712 
A.  Self-Determination ................................................................. 712 
B.  Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity Versus 
Secession ................................................................................... 715 
C.  Democratic Legitimacy ........................................................... 718 
IV.  Individualist Visions: International Human Rights and 
Armed Conflict as a State of Exception ........................................ 724 
A.  The Right to Life and Internal Hostilities ...................... 724 
B.  The Collapse into the “Armed Conflict” Discourse ...... 729 
1.  The Emergence of the “Armed Conflict” Discourse as 
a Proxy for Jus ad Bellum in Noninternational Armed 
Conflicts ................................................................................ 729 
2.  The Circularity of the “Armed Conflict” Discourse ......... 735 
3.  The Normative Limitations of Jus in Bello as a Proxy 
for Jus ad Bellum ................................................................ 736 
4.  Equal Application, the Absence of Fault, and 
Accountability Gap ............................................................. 739 
V.  Toward a Working Doctrine of Internal JUS AD BELLUM .............. 740 
A.  The Right to Life as a Prohibition on the First Resort 
to Hostilities ............................................................................ 740 
B.  Necessity, Proportionality, and the Meaning of 
Thresholds ............................................................................... 742 
C.  Application to Nonstate Actors .......................................... 743 
D.  A System of Presumptions ...................................................... 746 
Conclusion .................................................................................................. 747 
Lieblich-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:20 PM 
April 2016] INTERNAL JUS AD BELLUM 689 
Introduction 
In 1945, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter famously set out “to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”1 Undoubtedly, the 
Charter’s framers had in mind, when phrasing this ambitious goal, the 
two World Wars that have brought “untold sorrow to mankind” during 
the twentieth century.2 Accordingly, the Charter’s Article 2(4) laid down 
the first comprehensive legal prohibition on the interstate use of force, 
providing that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against . . . any state[.]”3 
However, nowadays, interstate wars are by no means the main cause 
of the human suffering that the framers wished to prevent. Of the 254 
armed conflicts recorded between 1946 and 2013 by a leading database, 
only twenty-four have been categorized as interstate conflicts, while a 
staggering number of 153 intrastate conflicts were recorded.4 Civil wars 
are not only more numerous, but are also extremely violent, intractable, 
and often accompanied by mass atrocities. In Syria, for instance, as of 
late 2015, the U.N. estimated that over 200,000 people have died in 
almost five years of strife, with no end in sight. In Europe and across the 
Middle East, the Syrian civil war accounts for one of the worst refugee 
crises in recent history.5 
Yet, seventy years after the conclusion of the U.N. Charter, 
mainstream international legal doctrine still remains awkwardly silent 
regarding the decision to resort to force within state borders—whether 
by governments or opposition groups.6 Oddly, this has been the case 
although international law has made significant strides, in the past 
decades, into issues long considered strictly matters of internal affairs.7 
Indeed, the U.N. Charter itself reflects a compromise between idealism 
and post-war realism: during its formation, utopian visions of a 
cosmopolitan world order were reconciled with enduring notions of state 
sovereignty.8 The significant achievement of Article 2(4) was thus not 
 
 1. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. art. 2(4) (emphasis added). 
 4. The rest were mixed conflicts. See World Map, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 
www.ucdp.uu.se/database (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 5. About the Crisis, OCHA, http://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic/syria-country-
profile/about-crisis (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); Ariane Rummery, Worsening Conditions Inside Syria 
and the Region Fuel Despair, Driving Thousands Towards Europe, UNHCR News Stories (Sept. 8, 
2015), http://www.unhcr.org/55eed5d66.html. 
 6. The same awkwardness is found in the study of the ethics of war. See Cécile Fabre, 
Cosmopolitan War 131 (2012). 
 7. Namely, through the growth of international human rights law. For a comprehensive 
overview, see Philip Alston & Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights (2013). 
 8. See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 45–46 (2010). 
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extended to internal resorts to force, leaving intact the pre-Charter legal 
regime on the issue. 
Pre-Charter law, being statist and sovereignty-centered, assumed 
freedom of action within state borders, even concerning decisions to 
resort to force. The general norm of nonintervention in internal affairs, 
supplemented by the perception that international law cannot regulate 
actions by individuals, resulted in the view that both governments, when 
asserting their sovereignty, and individuals, when embarking on 
rebellion, were free to resort to force. Since the U.N. Charter did not 
alter this approach, the question of intrastate resort to force—or internal 
jus ad bellum—remained a “blank spot” of international law throughout 
the post-war legal order.9 Surprisingly, the vast majority of international 
legal discourse—usually keen on expanding the reach of international 
law—proved consistently deferential in this context. In 1947, Hersch 
Lauterpacht wrote that internal jus ad bellum was a matter for future 
development.10 Sixty-seven years later, Yoram Dinstein still concedes 
that international law’s silence on internal resorts to force remains the 
“indisputable, albeit grim, reality.”11 Indeed, virtually all of the writing on 
jus ad bellum and internal strife, throughout the years, tended to focus on 
the question of intervention, meaning, the extent to which external parties 
may support this or that party, and not on the resort to force by the 
internal parties themselves.12 
International legal discourse thus refrains from addressing the 
legality of the decision to resort to internal force, although civil wars are 
the worst form of mass violence in the contemporary international 
system. This Article argues that this cannot be justified either in 
jurisprudential terms or in terms of policy. As it demonstrates, the 
 
 9. See Inger Österdahl, The Gentle Modernizer of the Law of Armed Conflict?, in JUS POST 
BELLUM: Mapping the Normative Foundations 207, 227 (Carsten Stahn et al. eds., 2014). 
 10. Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 93 (1947). 
 11. Yoram Dinstein, Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law 5 (2014); see 
also Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion 997, I.C.J. 141, ¶ 80 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion]; Olivier Corten, The Russian Intervention in the Ukrainian Crises: Was Jus Contra Bellum 
Confirmed Rather than Weakened?, 2 J. Use Force & Int’l L. 17 n.43 (2015) (arguing that Article 2(4) 
has not been extended to the internal realm, and although some governmental resort to force is 
condemned, this simply reflects expansion of Security Council powers and not a primary prohibition; 
arguing that international law does not prohibit resort to force by opposition groups); see also Claus 
Kress, Major Post-Westphalian Shifts and Some Important Neo-Westphalian Hesitations in the State 
Practice on the International Law on the Use of Force, 1 J. Use Force & Int’l L. 11, 13–14, 25, 41–42, 
51–52 (2014). But see Kirsti Samuels, Jus ad Bellum and Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of the 
International Community’s Approach to Violence in the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 8 J. Conf. & Sec. L. 
315 (2003) (arguing that international practice concerning the conflict in Sierra Leone might 
foreshadow emerging norms of jus ad bellum in “civil conflicts”). 
 12. Countless works focus mainly on intervention. See, e.g., Humanitarian Intervention: 
Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003); The 
International Law of Civil War (Richard A. Falk ed., 1971). 
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current legal situation, in which external use of force is regulated under 
the U.N. Charter while internal resort to force remains in legal limbo, is a 
peculiar moment in the history of international legal theory. It undercuts 
the coherence of the international legal system and thus also its 
legitimacy. 
This Article therefore attempts to break the deadlock on internal 
force by suggesting a theory that can be ethically justified; is equally 
applicable to both governments and opposition groups; and can be 
grounded in reasonable interpretation of existing legal standards. The 
basic argument is that internal resorts to full-fledged hostilities—whether 
by governments or opposition groups—are generally prohibited, and can 
only be undertaken in self-defense or in defense of others against a 
threat to life or limb, of the scale and effect that usually emanates only 
from a prior resort to armed hostilities. Should this theory be accepted, it 
could usher in a new sphere of legal responsibility, not only for violations 
of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) during internal armed 
conflicts, but also for the mere resort to armed force within state borders. 
This Article locates the theoretical grounds for such a rule in 
revisionist just war theory. As detailed later on, revisionist just war 
theory is a school in the study of the ethics of war, which proceeds from 
the basic proposition that all acts of killing—whether individual or 
collective—are subjected to the same morality. Revisionists first make 
the widely accepted claim that individuals are permitted to kill only in 
defense of self or others (“self-or-other-defense”) from grave threats, 
subject to necessity and proportionality limitations. They then move to 
make the radical (yet still intuitive) claim that individuals cannot shake 
off these limitations simply by acting through a collective, such as by the 
“people” or even the “state.”13 
Applying this reasoning to international legal concepts reveals that a 
morally coherent standard on internal resort to force must conform to 
three mutually complementing rules. First, it cannot presume that 
different morality governs collective action versus individual action, 
which must result in similar standards for governments, peoples, and 
individuals. Second, since resort to force is about killing, it cannot be 
more permissive than the self-or-other-defense standard. Third, a 
standard on the internal resort to force cannot conflate the right to 
something (such as sovereignty, self-determination, or democracy) with 
the right to use armed violence—essentially, to kill—to achieve it. 
After laying down the ethical point of departure described above, 
this Article locates the legal grounding for such self-or-other-defense 
rule in the right to life, as enshrined in positive international human 
 
 13. For a short overview of the debate, see Cécile Fabre & Seth Lazar, Introduction, in The 
Morality of Defensive War 1–3 (Cécile Fabre & Seth Lazar eds., 2014). 
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rights law (“IHRL”). The right to life is a proper venue for the regulation 
of internal resorts to force since IHRL, in general, deals with intrastate 
relations. In this context, the right to life sets out to protect the lives of 
everyone affected by a decision to employ armed force: soldiers, 
members of opposition groups, or civilians likely to get caught in the 
crossfire. By regulating this decision, the right to life can serve as a 
complementing defense even for persons that might lawfully lose their 
lives under the law of armed conflict, if a decision to resort to force is 
made. To emphasize the point further, since the question of resort to 
force deals with the mere decision to embark on hostilities, it is distinct 
from the manner in which the hostilities are actually conducted (jus in 
bello). The right to life, if understood as a prohibition on internal resort 
to force, can therefore add an additional layer of legal analysis, even if 
the forcible acts themselves are conducted lawfully under jus in bello. 
However, as this Article demonstrates, the current understanding of 
IHRL requires significant development in order for this task to be 
fulfilled. 
This Article does not presume to outline each and every aspect of 
the prohibition on internal force and its self-defense exception. A myriad 
of questions can be asked: How do we define an “armed attack” on the 
internal level, considering that it is often difficult to identify the relevant 
actors, operating in informal frameworks? Should the concept of 
anticipatory self-defense apply in internal settings? What role, if any, 
should be reserved for collective self-defense in the internal sphere? 
What part would the U.N. Security Council play? Should the strict 
separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello—still the prevalent 
view concerning international uses of force—be maintained in the 
internal realm? How well positioned is the international community in 
assessing internal resorts to force? When referring to nonstate actors, 
should their actions be assessed according to individual or collective, 
corporate-like responsibility? Such questions are all important and merit 
further study. This Article, however, aims to set the general baseline for 
the assessment of internal resort to force, hopefully sparking further 
discussion of this long, averted issue. 
Before moving on, some distinctions are required to clarify the 
boundaries of our discussion. Mainly, we need to define the meaning of 
“resort to force,” to which the suggested prohibition applies. Indeed, the 
power to coerce in a defined territory is a basic tenet of sovereignty, to 
some even its defining element.14 Coercion, of course, implies a wide 
 
 14. See, e.g., Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in The Vocation Lectures 32, 33 (David Owen 
& Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004) (stating famously that “the state is the form 
of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence 
within a particular territory”); see also Lassa Oppenheim, 1 International Law: A Treatise § 123 (2d 
ed. 1912) (defining sovereignty as “supreme authority”). 
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spectrum of actions. Obviously, some level of coercion is a given within a 
state, not every form of which could possibly amount to a prohibited use 
of force. For instance, the use of law enforcement agencies and 
adjudicatory bodies for securing the public interest is not the type of 
force envisioned here. Chiefly, this is because coercive force in the form 
of law enforcement does not usually entail intentional killing, but only 
the use of physical force necessary for the arrest and trial of a suspected 
individual. When lethal force is undertaken during a law enforcement 
action, it is only as a last resort, in defense against a specific, imminent 
threat. Importantly, that threat is assessed individually, and would result 
in a permission to kill in very narrow circumstances.15 Citizens, too, may 
in fact engage in what could be described as coercion against the state. 
Such actions can consist of wide-scale, nonviolent civil resistance, which 
might diminish the state’s capacity to act;16 or of demonstrations that 
involve some level of random violence, which occasionally occur in even 
the most stable of democracies.17 Just as this Article does not deal with 
every form of state coercion, it is not concerned with all forms of citizen-
induced coercion. 
When discussing internal resorts to force, this Article refers only to 
coercive power in the form of hostilities, whether undertaken by 
governments or opposition groups. It also excludes all other “non-
forcible” coercive actions, such as those routinely undertaken by states in 
the context of law enforcement action, or by citizens in nonviolent 
resistance or random rioting. Hostilities, as a matter of fact, differ from 
“regular” coercive acts in several aspects. Namely, during hostilities, 
persons are lethally attacked in light of their status or function, and not 
necessarily in light of an imminently materializing threat. Further, the 
degree and type of force used in hostilities is not subjected to a use-of-
force continuum, and, in general, arrest is not attempted prior to attack.18 
Coercive power is employed without previous adjudication, and 
 
 15. See Eliav Lieblich, Quasi-Hostile Acts: The Limits on Forcible Disruption Operations Under 
International Law, 32 B.U. Int’l L.J. 355, 365–70 (2014) (outlining the law enforcement paradigm). 
 16. See, e.g., M. K. Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance (1961); Gene Sharp, The Meanings of Non-
Violence: A Typology, 3 Conf. Resol. 41, 42 (1959). 
 17. See, e.g., Carl-Ulrik Schierup & Aleksandra Ålund, The End of Swedish Exceptionalism? 
Citizenship, Neoliberalism and the Politics of Exclusion, 53 Race & Class 45 (2011). 
 18. I reserve the question whether there is also a legal obligation to capture rather than kill during 
hostilities. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 62(1) PD 507 ¶ 40 
[2006] (Isr.); Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 77 (2009); Gabriella Blum, 
The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. Legal Analysis 69, 115 (2010); Ryan Goodman, The Power to 
Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 819 (2013). But see W. Hays Parks, Part IX of 
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 
42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 769, 799–812 (2010). 
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proportionate incidental harm to uninvolved civilians is tolerated.19 
When violence is undertaken by nonstate actors, a factual threshold of 
intensity, protraction, and organization must be crossed, in order for the 
acts to constitute hostilities—as opposed to “regular” acts of violence 
associated with “normal” criminal activity.20 The focus on hostilities, as 
opposed to other forms of coercion, can be justified on two main counts. 
First, the resort to coercive force short of hostilities is relatively well-
regulated under human rights law.21 Second, since the resort to hostilities 
is about intentional killing, it differs morally from any other form of 
coercion. Obviously, it is the most detrimental to human life and security. 
A further distinction must be made. Sometimes, citizen coercion can 
result in regime change. This could be achieved either through an extra-
constitutional revolution, or by a coercive removal of a government in 
circumstances permitted under the state’s own constitutional order.22 The 
legality of such outcomes, in international law, is all too often conflated 
with the lawfulness of force employed to achieve them. Lauterpacht, for 
instance, argued that as long as international law does not prohibit 
revolutions “it cannot condemn the means, necessarily violent, by which 
they are achieved.”23 However, this is a fundamental mistake, since it 
obfuscates objectives and means. Overthrowing a government can be an 
outcome of civil unrest,24 but it does not necessarily require the use of 
armed force.25 In legal terms, thus, it is perfectly possible that in certain 
 
 19. See Lieblich, supra note 15, at 366; see also Jens David Ohlin, Acting as a Sovereign Versus Acting as 
a Belligerent 11–15 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 14–21, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2456754 (providing a theoretical distinction between situations in which 
states act as “sovereigns” and as “belligerents”). 
 20. The widely accepted definition of “armed conflict” espoused by the International Criminal 
Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) is helpful in this context. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case 
No. IT-94-1-I, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995) (holding that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States 
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a state”); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, art. 1(2) [hereinafter Protocol II] (excluding 
from the definition of armed conflict “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts”). 
 21. See, e.g., Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
arts. 6, 9, 10, 12, 15, 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (Sept. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Basic Principles]; 
McCann v. U.K., 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 ¶¶ 146–50 (1995). 
 22. Tom Ginsburg et al., When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s 
Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1184, 1193 (2013). 
 23. Lauterpacht, supra note 10, at 107. 
 24. See Ted Gurr, Psychological Factors in Civil Violence, 20 World Pol. 245, 246 (1968) 
(“[R]evolutions are but one of an extraordinarily numerous variety of interrelated forms of strife.”). 
 25. See Jack A. Goldstone, Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory, 4 Ann. Rev. 
Pol. Sci. 139, 142 (2001); Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings 277, 277–78 (Peter Demetz ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., 1986) (noting a 
common problem in certain legal philosophies in which violence is always viewed as justified when 
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circumstances, revolution, as an outcome, would be permitted, but resort 
to hostilities to achieve it would not. Analytically speaking, therefore, the 
legality of revolutions and the measures that bring them about should be 
discussed separately. 
The Article is structured as follows. Part I offers historical context 
for the current international legal discourse concerning internal resorts 
to force. As it demonstrates, in the legal order established by the U.N. 
Charter, the law concerning external and internal resorts to force became 
divergent: for the first time, external resort to force was legally regulated, 
while internal force remained beyond the reach of law. The Part criticizes 
this doctrinal divergence as a peculiar and incoherent moment in 
international legal history. 
Part II introduces revisionist just war theory as a possible ethical 
framework to inform the construction of a legal doctrine concerning 
internal resorts to force. This framework rejects collectivist justifications 
for killing and suggests the right of self-or-other-defense as the proper 
baseline for the assessment of internal jus ad bellum. 
Part III discusses several possible “collective” visions for internal jus 
ad bellum and proceeds to demonstrate that these are unsatisfactory. It 
shows that self-determination, sovereignty, territorial integrity, or 
democratic legitimacy are in themselves insufficient as proper justifications 
for killing—unless we adopt a collectivist (and thus wrong) view of 
permissions to kill. This Part discusses other specific shortcomings of these 
possible frameworks. 
Part IV suggests IHRL, and in particular the right to life, as a proper 
international legal basis for both the prohibition on the internal resort to 
hostilities and its exceptions. However, it also demonstrates that positive 
IHRL, as currently applied in leading judicial decisions, is not developed 
enough to support a workable doctrine of internal jus ad bellum. In 
particular, this Part highlights that in practice, once an internal armed 
conflict erupts, the right to life collapses into IHL, which severely limits 
IHRL’s potential to regulate the resort to force itself. International legal 
discourse is thus preoccupied with the question of whether an “armed 
conflict” exists, as a proxy for jus ad bellum questions. This interaction 
between IHRL and IHL replicates the pre-Charter relations between the 
law of “peace” and the law of “war,” which assumed that sovereigns had 
a prerogative to move freely between these realms. The Part then 
proceeds to demonstrate why this situation is unsatisfactory: chiefly, it 
 
undertaken for seemingly just ends); see also Aristotle, The Politics 198 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 
1908) (noting that “[r]evolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud”). A recent example 
for an outcome of revolution without use of armed force is the 2011 “Jasmine Revolution” in Tunisia. 
See generally Nouri Gana, Introduction: Collaborative Revolutionism, in The Making of the Tunisian 
Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects (Nouri Gana ed., 2013) (providing a backdrop and 
history behind the Tunisian revolution). 
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results in a circular situation in which the factual existence of an armed 
conflict becomes a normative justification for the resort to hostilities. 
Part V presents a preliminary working doctrine of internal jus ad 
bellum, which branches out from the right to life, but which refrains from 
collapsing into IHL once hostilities commence. It argues that the right to 
life should be read as a prohibition on the first resort to internal 
hostilities, qualified only by a right to self-and-other-defense, and subject 
to necessity and proportionality requirements. It further posits that such 
a standard can and should be applied to governments, but also to 
nonstate actors. Finally, the Part maintains that although, in general, 
similar standards of resort to force apply to governments and opposition 
groups, it is possible to envision a system of factual presumptions to 
provide some flexibility in the application of this rule. 
I.  External and Internal JUS AD BELLUM in International Law 
The modern law on jus ad bellum can best be described as reflecting 
an uneasy doctrinal split, signifying a peculiar moment in the history of 
international law. This Part surveys how this divergence came to be, from 
the pioneering era of international law until today’s post-U.N. Charter 
legal order, and offers a critique of the current understanding of the law. 
A. Positive Unification: Natural Law Regulating All Realms of 
Force 
The roots of modern international law lie in natural law thought, its 
basic premise being that morality determines law’s validity and content.26 
Natural law, of course, could not be blind to internal resorts to force: 
since it was based on universal truths applicable to all spheres of human 
activity, natural law covered both external and internal uses of force, 
whether by rulers or subjects. As every sovereign conduct could be 
assessed in light of laws derived from morality, and because natural law 
bound kings as well as individuals,27 there was no reason to a priori 
exclude internal wars from the moral legal discourse. 
The ruling natural law framework for the assessment of resort to 
force was provided by traditional just war theory. An amalgamation of 
Greco-Roman and Catholic ideas going back to authorities such as 
 
 26. See Stephen C. Neff, Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law ch. 2 (2014). 
 27. See id. at 163 (noting that “natural law was applicable to kings, as well as to ordinary 
people”). This perception was rooted in the late-medieval jus commune. See Randal Lesaffer, The 
Nature and Sources of Europe’s Classical Law of Nations 6 (June 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript, 
Tilburg University), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2623086 (“Canon and Roman 
law [jus commune] embodied the ideal of divine justice and translated it into myriads of concrete rules 
. . . Princes and rulers, as well as any common man, were equally subject to their commands.”). 
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Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas,28 just war theory outlined 
conditions for a resort to war to be morally just.29 War, to be just, had to 
fulfill several well-known criteria: just cause, right intention, proper 
authority, last resort, probability of success and proportionality.30 
Now, it remains debatable whether classic just war criteria were 
meant to be applied as such to internal wars. Some commentators argue 
that the theory did not at all constrain internal resort to force by rulers.31 
Regarding resort to force by subjects, conversely, the precondition that a 
just war could only be conducted by a proper (or legitimate) authority—
meaning, by the sovereign—served as the most significant barrier.32 
Nonetheless, it would be imprecise to say that “law” was silent on 
internal resorts to force, although it did not address them in just war 
language.33 It would be more accurate to say that such law in fact existed, 
but was simply heavily skewed in favor of rulers. Indeed, Catholic 
doctrine explicitly condoned internal force by rulers without clear 
restrictions. This outcome was justified on moral grounds: the ruler, after 
all, was “God’s minister.”34 Additionally, if the ruler represents the deity, 
and the deity is of course just, it is only a logical result that subjects could 
never undertake a just war against him.35 To Augustine, thus, “rebellion” 
was an evil motive per se and, as such, a true sin.36 
But what if the sovereign unjustly threatened the lives of its 
subjects? Although Catholic doctrine recognized self-defense as a natural 
right, it could not be understood as such to justify hostilities against the 
 
 28. See John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations 65–68 (1935); Brian 
Orend, War, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (July 28, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/. 
 29. In ancient Rome, for instance, a regular procedure was even laid down in which 
“independent” priests, known as fetials, would determine, even if only symbolically, the justness of this 
or that decision to wage war. See Neff, supra note 26, at 32–33. 
 30. Orend, supra note 28. 
 31. James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and 
Historical Inquiry 49–59 (1981). 
 32. Augustine, Against Faustus bk. XII, ch. LXXV, reprinted in Eppstein, supra note 28, at 69–70; 
Thomas Aquinas, Question 40: War, Summa Theologica, http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (“[I]t is not the business of a private individual to declare war,” and 
conversely, it is the business of “those in authority . . . to have recourse to the sword . . . against 
internal disturbances.”). 
 33. See Fabre, supra note 6, at 131 (arguing that in fact, just war theory is relevant to internal as 
well as external conflicts). 
 34. Aquinas, supra note 32. 
 35. See Francisco de Vitoria, On Civil Power § 10, in Vitoria: Political Writings 3, 18–19 
(Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991) (“[P]ublic power is of God . . . as such it is just and 
legitimate . . . .”). Indeed, this understanding led, for instance, the Austrian Episcopate, to declare—as 
late as 1933—after the rise of the totalitarian Dollfuss regime—that since the state is the 
“representative of God,” “[r]evolution and any attempt to upset authority by force are condemned.” 
Contemporary Errors Relating to the Totalitarian Nation-State, Letter of the Austrian Episcopate, 
Vienna (Dec. 21, 1933), reprinted in Eppstein, supra note 28, at 375. 
 36. Augustine, supra note 32, at 84. 
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sovereign.37 Employing the famous doctrine of double effect, Aquinas 
recognized the lawfulness of killing in self-defense, but only when the 
intention was to save one’s own life rather than killing the aggressor.38 
Conversely, acting with an intention to kill—such “as in the case of a 
soldier fighting against the foe”—could only be justified if performed for 
the public good, a task strictly entrusted to the sovereign.39 Thus, even if 
individuals could act in individual self-defense, resort to hostilities, as 
commonly understood, was beyond what natural law allowed them. 
The explicit idea of a (limited) right of organized resistance came 
about only with the Reformation of the sixteenth century. At first, 
Calvin’s teachings followed the old Christian doctrine of “turning the 
other cheek,” by implying that Christian subjects must respond to 
persecution by prayer and patience.40 However, after the St. 
Bartholomew Massacre of 1582,41 a major reconstruction of Reformist 
“resistance theory” was needed. The emerging framework for such 
theory was through the idea of the social contract, the breach of which 
would entail some right of resistance.42 Simply put, such theories 
presumed a tri-partite contract between God, the ruler, and the people, 
requiring obedience to the laws of God and nature in return, so to speak, 
for divine protection. If the ruler violated the contract by becoming a 
tyrant, active resistance was permitted, even by warfare.43 However, even 
in such cases, the right to resist was not granted to private individuals, 
but rather to public representatives (lesser magistrates), who would be 
charged with conducting orderly resistance.44 
These ideas were further developed by the post-Westphalian 
pioneers of international law, such as Grotius, Pufendorf, and later on 
Vattel, who attempted to deduce a coherent system of international legal 
norms from principles of natural law.45 In terms of internal use of force, 
these thinkers adopted a conciliatory stance, in which obedience remains 
 
 37. Cf. Neff, supra note 26, at 70 (noting that right to self-defense was available to ordinary 
subjects against superiors, but was narrowly confined to warding off attacks). 
 38. Thomas Aquinas, Question 64: Murder, Summa Theologica art. 7, http://www.newadvent.org/ 
summa/3040.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 39. Id. (“[I]t is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have 
public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in 
the case of a soldier fighting against the foe.”). For the same reasons, private individuals were 
prohibited from killing sinners, since “the care of the common good is entrusted to . . . public 
authority.” Id. art. 3. 
 40. See John Witte, Jr., The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion and Human Rights in 
Early Modern Calvinism 85 (2007). 
 41. The massacre was ordered by King Charles against French Calvinists. Id. at 84–87. 
 42. Id. at 86. 
 43. Id. at 84–87, 105, 115. 
 44. Id. 
 45. For a historical overview of the transformation of natural law into “international” law, see 
Neff, supra note 26, chs. 3–4. 
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the nearly absolute norm, yet some form of rightful resistance was 
recognized.46 Like natural law thinkers before them, early international 
lawyers took for granted, or at least did not categorically reject, the 
power of sovereigns to resort to internal armed force (a “mixed” public-
private war, in Grotius’ terms).47 However, social-contractarian thought 
delineated, to some extent, this right to use force, implying that 
sovereigns must use force only within the confines of the social contract. 
To Vattel, for instance, as long as the prince acted for the public good—
as required by the contract48he was perfectly justified to use 
proportional force to quell “unjust” rebels.49 
Nonetheless, even to the social-contractarian pioneers of international 
law, the right to use force for the “public good” was not granted as such to 
subjects.50 Citizens generally owed a “duty of nonresistance” to the 
sovereign. Thus, to Grotius, even if ordered to act contrary to the law of 
nature or the “Commands of God,” subjects could at most practice 
disobedience, but could not actively resist by force.51 Being a rationalist, 
Grotius justified this rule mainly through consequentialist reasoning: a too 
“promiscuous” right to resist would destroy the state, and even an unjust 
state is preferable, from the point of view of the citizen, to no state at all.52 
However, the obligation of nonresistance could not be absolute if natural 
law was to remain coherent: a total obligation to submit would be 
tantamount to suicide. Thus, early international lawyers recognized a 
cautious and muffled right of internal self-defense. As Grotius conceded, 
resistance might be justified in case of “extreme and inevitable danger,”53 
when the threat was undeniable or when the sovereign assaults first.54 
 
 46. To Kant, their modest attempts at constraining power, which could always be used to justify 
any attack, earned Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel the unflattering label “miserable comforters.” 
Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law, 15 Eur. J. 
Int’l Rel. 395, 411–12 (2009); see also Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace § II (1795). 
 47. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace bk. III ch. 3, § 1, ch. 4 §§ 1–2 (Richard Tuck 
ed., 2005). 
 48. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations ch. IV, §§ 38–39 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore 
eds., 2008). 
 49. Id. ch. XVIII, §§ 287–90. 
 50. This is despite the fact that Grotius, for instance, embraced the idea of “private war,” but not 
by peoples against sovereigns. See Grotius, supra note 47. 
 51. Id. at 337–38. 
 52. Id. at 346–47. This consequentialist reasoning was common. See Samuel Pufendorf, Of the 
Law of Nature and Nations 716 (Basil Kennett trans., 1729). This was also the view of Hobbes, to 
whom the return to the state of nature and civil war was deemed worse than any suffering possibly 
caused by the sovereign. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ch. XVIII (1651) (“[T]he greatest that in any 
form of government can possibly happen to the people in general is scarce sensible, in respect of the 
miseries and horrible calamities that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of masterless 
men without subjection to laws.”). 
 53. Grotius, supra note 47, at 356–57. 
 54. Id. at 359 (“David did not do this [gathered armed men to defend himself] till he was assured 
. . . [by] many infallible Proofs, that Saul really sought his Life.”); see also id. at 360 (noting that the 
Maccabees, like David, did not use their arms “unless first assaulted”). 
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Pufendorf also recognized—albeit with visible reluctance—that “upon 
the approach of extreme danger” subjects could take up arms strictly for 
self-defense.55 Similarly, to Vattel, when a prince “attacks the 
constitution of the state” the social contract is broken and resistance is 
justified,”56 but he nevertheless stressed that the scope and nature of the 
response depended on the gravity of the prince’s violation.57 
Thus, the early roots of international law, derived from the law of 
nature and social-contractarianism, explicitly addressed both external 
and internal uses of force. As such, early international legal thought was 
coherent: it reflected a positive unification of legal doctrine, in the sense 
that both realms of force were not perceived as beyond any form of legal 
judgment. 
B. From Negative Unification to Doctrinal Divergence 
The positive unification of external and internal uses of force did 
not survive, however, the decline of natural law theory. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, naturalist thinking in international law gradually 
weakened, as international legal positivism reached its pinnacle of 
influence in the turn of the century.58 Responding, to a major extent, to 
Austin’s famous critique of international “law” as mere morality,59 
international legal positivism was mostly concerned with pinpointing the 
“sources” of binding international norms. In its most common form, it 
asserted that in absence of accepted notions of “natural law,” there could 
be no binding law beyond the explicit or tacit consent of states.60 
International legal positivism was augmented by two complementing, 
longstanding processes of the Westphalian order: (1) the weakening of 
the authority of the church, and (2) the consolidation of the secular state 
 
 55. Pufendorf, supra note 52, at 721–23. 
 56. Vattel, supra note 48, ch. IV, § 51. 
 57. Id. at 105–06 (distinguishing between a situation in which the ruler “violates the fundamental 
laws” in which resistance is permissible but the person of the sovereign must be spared, and situations 
in which the prince uses “extreme violence” and “manifestly tends to the ruin of the nation” in which 
the prince himself can be targeted). 
 58. See Mónica García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law 25 
(2013); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion, 
17 Quinn. L. Rev. 99, 113 (1996); Hersch Lauterpacht, Westlake and Present Day International Law, 
15 Economica 307, 309 (1925) (noting that “undisputed domination of the positivist method” in the 
early twentieth century). 
 59. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 176–77 (Sarah Austin ed., 1861). 
Much of the early twentieth century positivist writing responded to that challenge. See, e.g., 
Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 2; cf. Kennedy, supra note 58, at 117 (noting that international law 
positivists were ultimately describing “a self-evident system of rules”). 
 60. As stated by Oppenheim, “[t]he so-called Law of Nations is nothing else than a body of 
customary and conventional rules regulating the conduct of the individual States with each other.” 
Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 7. These rules are only those established by “common consent.” Id. §§ 11–12. 
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as the main political actor, which in turn strengthened the notion of 
sovereignty.61 
Of course, this process affected the relations between law and just 
war theory.62 As long as there was no “judge” among nations, wars could 
not be discussed in terms of objective justice.63 As phrased by Henry 
Wheaton, “A war in form, or duly commenced, is to be considered, as to 
its effects, as just on both sides.”64 Many positivists thus accepted war as a 
given, a factual “condition” that international law merely attempted to 
regulate.65 Oppenheim, for instance, even rejected the obligation to 
present any justification for war, as it was a complete sovereign 
prerogative.66 The system of international law was thus organized on an 
axis between “war” and “peace.” It was a system not of justice but of 
consequence: states could virtually always choose to wage war, if they 
were willing to pay the practical—rather than legal—price.67 External 
resorts to force were thus excluded from the legal discourse. 
In its essence, this approach was replicated in the internal realm, 
although not strictly in such terms. As absolute state sovereignty and its 
derivative of nonintervention became the chief organizing principles of 
international law, it became impossible to discuss internal resort to force 
in international legal terms.68 In fact, just as international wars were 
 
 61. See Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect 150 (2011). 
 62. See generally Kress, supra note 11 (reflecting on the development on the international law by 
identifying post-Westphalian shifts and hesitations). 
 63. Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law § 290 (Richard Henry Dana ed., 1866). 
Indeed, some maintained the view that there are applicable moral criteria of just war, but these could 
only be assessed by the participants themselves in absence of an external judge. See Theodore D. 
Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law § 111 (1860). This approach can be 
found in Grotius’ reasoning—following medieval thought—according to which natural law bound “in 
conscience” and was enforced by God, while positive law was enforceable by humans. See Lesaffer, 
supra note 27, at 11–12. 
 64. Wheaton, supra note 63, § 295. For similar reasons regarding internal wars, see id. § 296. 
 65. Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 53 (“[W]ar is not inconsistent with, but a condition regulated by, 
International Law.”); see Woolsey, supra note 63, § 110 (“International law assumes that there must 
be ‘wars and fightings’ among nations, and endeavors to lay down rules by which they shall be brought 
within the limits of justice and humanity.”); see also William Edward Hall, A Treatise on 
International Law §§ 15–17 (2d ed. 1884). 
 66. Oppenheim, supra note 14, §§ 54, 61 (“[A]ll such rules [of just war] laid down by writers . . . 
are rules of writers, but not rules of International Law.”). 
 67. Eliav Lieblich, International Law and Civil Wars: Intervention and Consent 74 (2013); 
see, e.g., Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 53 (discussing “war” and “peace” as choices that states make, 
each condition regulated by a different set of rules). It should also be added that in general, war was 
perceived not only as beyond legal regulation, but also positively a legitimate mean of redress and 
punishment. See David Luban, War as Punishment, 39 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 299 (2012). On the internal 
level, dueling was de facto perceived as a legitimate means to settle disputes even well into the 
nineteenth century. See Martin J. Wiener, Men of Blood: Violence, Manliness and Criminal 
Justice in Victorian England 42–45 (2004). 
 68. See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 123–28 (detailing the development of the absolute 
understanding of sovereignty throughout the nineteenth century). Robert Lansing, later Secretary of 
State, defined sovereignty in the early twentieth century as “the power . . . to do all things in a state 
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understood as a given fact of external relations, civil strife was a given 
fact of internal relations. Thus, Woolsey, for instance, stated bluntly 
“[w]ith civil wars international jus has nothing to do.”69 Wheaton 
contended that like its approach toward international wars, international 
law made no distinction “between a just and unjust” civil war.70 At best, 
international law sought to regulate the effects of civil wars on third 
parties; it was not concerned by the rights of the internal parties 
themselves.71 In this context, the American Civil War provides a striking 
example: although slavery was perceived as a glaring immorality by 
Britain, the latter—as well as other major European powers—
maintained strict neutrality toward both parties.72 
The triumph of this approach was born through the political struggle 
between competing visions of sovereignty in nineteenth century 
Europe—pitting “legitimist” perceptions of sovereignty, espoused by the 
conservative powers of the Holy Alliance, against those based on factual 
effective control, championed by Britain.73 Legitimism presumed the 
existence of essential, inherent rights of legitimate sovereignty, and thus 
rejected any revolution or forcible resistance, while justifying intervention to 
maintain beleaguered monarchs. Unsurprisingly, the Holy Alliance was 
viewed as a “union of despotic sovereigns” by the emerging liberal 
order.74 Legitimism and its attendant doctrine of intervention eroded 
with the growing predominance of Britain, which condemned it as 
inconsistent with international law, and specifically with the principle of 
nonintervention.75 A nineteenth century commentator noted that the 
 
without accountability;” its exercise “is simply the application or the menace of brute force.” Robert 
Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State, 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 105, 110 (1907); see also Montague 
Bernard, On the Principle of Non-Intervention (1860); Augustus Granville Stapleton, 
Intervention and Non-intervention: The Foreign Policy of Great Britain from 1790 to 1865, at 3–
15 (1866). In the context of civil wars, see Samuels, supra note 11, at 319. 
 69. Woolsey, supra note 63, § 136. 
 70. Wheaton, supra note 63, § 23. 
 71. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 6 (arguing that in traditional international law the key question 
asked by states was “how does the conflict affect us” rather than “how does the conflict affect the 
political and humanitarian rights of internal parties”). 
 72. See id. at 99–106; Montague Bernard, A Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great 
Britain During the American Civil War 122–50 (1870) (detailing the Europeans’ declarations of 
neutrality, including original texts of declarations); see also John Stuart Mill, The Contest in 
America 6 (1862). 
 73. Thomas D. Grant, The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate an Evolution 
8–9 (1999). 
 74. See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 68, at 28 (“[T]here can be no doubt that in fact this [Holy] 
Alliance was nothing else but a union of despotic sovereigns in order to aid each other in protecting 
their absolute authority.”); see also Edward Payson Powell, Nullification and Secession in the 
United States: A History of the Six Attempts During the First Century of the Republic 243 
(1897); Wheaton, supra note 63, §§ 64–65. 
 75. Powell, supra note 74, at 243 (labeling Britain’s turn against legitimism as “the greatest event 
of the nineteenth century”); Stapleton, supra note 68, at 27–37 (contrasting the view of continental 
powers of the Holy Alliance and Britain regarding the question of legitimism and intervention); 
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principle of nonintervention became so dominant that “British statesmen 
had proclaimed it [as a principle of international law] not once, not twice, 
but on every imaginable occasion.”76 Divine or historic right thus gave 
way to effective control over territory as the key determinant of 
sovereign power, and effectiveness—being a question of fact—could be 
gained (or maintained) by brute power, whether exercised by 
governments or rebels.77 
Despite this harsh outcome, effectiveness has some liberal appeal: it 
is based on the premise that peoples should be left alone to establish (or 
abolish) their own governments, without external interference, by the 
means they choose.78 With the solidification of the principle of self-
determination in the twentieth century, the principle of nonintervention 
thus found support also among liberal internationalists. Oscar Schachter, 
for instance, argued that the use of internal force was a corollary of 
peoples’ right to “decide for themselves what kind of government they 
want, and that this includes the right . . . to carry on armed conflict 
between competing groups.”79 
A further legal corollary of the predominance of sovereignty and 
nonintervention was the negation of individuals as subjects of 
international law: if state sovereignty is paramount, individuals must be 
subject only to the domestic system and thus remain beyond the reach of 
international regulation.80 Now, if international law could not impose 
duties, nor confer rights, upon individuals, it per se could not legalize nor 
prohibit resistance.81 Precisely for this reason Oppenheim stated that 
international law “is not competent to forbid private individuals to take 
up arms.”82 
 
Wheaton, supra note 63, §§ 65–67 (detailing the British position regarding several internal conflicts in 
the 1820s). 
 76. Stapleton, supra note 68, at 35. 
 77. Grant, supra note 73, at 9; Lieblich, supra note 67, at 22–23. 
 78. Bernard, supra note 68, at 9; Hall, supra note 65, § 94; Stapleton, supra note 68, at 3–15; 
Wheaton, supra note 63, § 72.  
 79. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, 1641 (1984); 
see also Falk, supra note 12, at 1, 5–6. 
 80. See, e.g., Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 13 (“Subjects of the rights and duties arising from the 
Law of Nations are States solely and exclusively.”); cf. Lauterpacht, supra note 58, at 309–10 
(describing this doctrine critically). 
 81. In the context of civil wars, international law only “kicked in” upon recognition of 
belligerency or insurgency, but this regulation, too, did not refer to the resort to force itself but only to 
the conduct of hostilities and rights vis-à-vis third parties. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 76–80. The 
earliest systematic exposition of the belligerency doctrine can be found in Richard Dana’s 1866 notes 
to Wheaton’s Elements of International Law. See Wheaton, supra note 63, § 23 n.15. 
 82. Oppenheim, supra note 14, § 57, at 92. This remains true although in the in bello level, 
individuals can be punished for fighting by the enemy. See id. It should be noted that Oppenheim 
discusses here the participation of individuals in international wars, but the reasoning applies of course 
also to internal wars. 
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However, saying that international law does not regulate armed 
resistance, or is “neutral” toward it,83 is not only doubtful in terms of legal 
theory,84 but also for all practical purposes, amounts to a recognition of a 
freedom to act.85 Thus, this “gap” in international law is in fact a legal 
carte blanche for resort to force both by sovereigns and subjects. As 
phrased by Hall: 
International law professes to be concerned with the relations of states 
to each other. Tyrannical conduct of a government towards its subjects, 
massacres and brutality in a civil war . . . are acts which have nothing to 
do directly or indirectly with such relations. . . . To some minds the 
excess of a revolution would seem more scandalous than the tyranny of 
a sovereign. In strictness they [tyranny and resistance] ought, degree for 
degree, to be precisely equivalent in the eye of the law.86 
In sum, the positivist, pre-Charter approach could be described as 
“negative unification” of jus ad bellum: international law assumed freedom 
to act both externally or internally. It reflected a coherent—even if 
objectionable—view about what international law can and cannot do. 
The international system finally moved to curtail (but not abolish) 
the war power of states after World War I, through the elaborate system 
enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations.87 The Covenant, 
however, remained silent on internal resort to force, by excluding 
matters “solely within the domestic jurisdiction” of a state party from the 
jurisdiction of the League.88 Later on, the Kellogg-Briand Pact manifestly 
renounced war only in relations between states,89 and the U.N. Charter, 
as discussed above, followed suit. Here, the foundations were made to a 
curious inconsistency in the modern international legal order—the 
divergence of external and internal jus ad bellum. While the former is 
strictly regulated, complete freedom is implied regarding the latter. 
C. A Critique of Doctrinal Divergence 
That the divergence discussed above raises significant problems is 
obvious. While earlier approaches—natural law and positivism—were 
upfront in their (positive or negative) attitudes toward all forms of force, 
it is increasingly difficult to defend a system that sets out to prohibit 
 
 83. See, e.g., Malcolm N. Shaw, Self-Determination and the Use of Force, in Minorities, Peoples 
and Self-Determination 35, 44 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005) (“The UN Charter 
neither confirms nor denies a right of rebellion. It is neutral.”). 
 84. See Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 304–07 (1952) (discussing so-called 
“gaps” in international law). 
 85. See id. at 305. 
 86. Hall, supra note 65, at 264–65 (emphasis added). 
 87. Covenant of the League of Nations, June 28, 1919, 4 U.K.T.S. 153 arts. 10–16. 
 88. Id. art. 15. The exclusion of internal conflicts from the League system was the main legal 
excuse for the League’s inaction toward the Spanish Civil War. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at 115–16. 
 89. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 
1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
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external resorts to force, yet turns a blind eye to internal ones. If a key 
objective of the contemporary legal order is to prevent the “scourge” of 
war,90 and it is a consensus that this scourge is no less grave in internal 
wars, a gross incoherency is revealed, which in turn affects the legitimacy 
of the legal order.91 In fact, this incoherency also undermines the 
prohibition on external force itself, given the tendency of internal 
conflicts to internationalize.92 
Moreover, the traditional jurisprudential explanations for the 
nonregulation of internal resort to force have become blatantly 
unconvincing. While in the past, sovereignty and nonintervention served 
as bulwarks for any international legal regulation of internal relations, 
contemporary international law reaches deep into spheres long considered 
at the core of state authority. Indeed, the protection of human rights,93 the 
regulation of national treatment of goods,94 and the protection of 
investors95 are not only pragmatic results of increasing interdependence, 
but also reflect the ever-changing understanding of sovereignty.96 In 
practice, international law’s extension to such fields weakens any claim 
that sovereignty in itself can serve as a shield against regulation of 
internal resorts to force; this is especially true considering the effects of 
civil wars on human life and well being. Conceptually, sovereignty itself 
was rephrased as a “responsibility” in contemporary international 
discourse,97 which further weakens the thrust of nonintervention as a 
justification for nonregulation. Similarly, the liberal, self-determination 
based justification for the freedom to resort to force internally is also 
unappealing. At its core, it requires us to concede that self-determination 
is a corollary of the ability to use effective violence—a view that depletes 
the idea of any substantive content.98 
 
 90. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 91. On the importance of coherence to normative legitimacy see Thomas Franck, The Power of 
Legitimacy Among Nations 150–82 (1990). 
 92. See generally Patrick M. Regan, Interventions into Civil Wars: Literature, Contemporary 
Policy and Future Research, in Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars 313 (Edward Newman & Karl 
DeRouen Jr., eds., 2014) (discussing both intervention by diplomatic and military or economic means 
in civil wars). 
 93. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 94. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 art. III. 
 95. See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States, March 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
 96. Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to 
Foreign Stakeholders, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 295, 295–301 (2013) (noting that due to modern global 
interconnectedness, sovereigns must take into account the external effects of their decisions). 
 97. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, (Sept. 16, 1948).  
 98. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 139; see also Dapo Akande & Zachary Vermeer, The Airstrikes 
Against Islamic State in Iraq and the Alleged Prohibition on Military Assistance to Governments in Civil 
Wars, EJIL: Talk! (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-in-iraq- 
and-the-alleged-prohibition-on-military-assistance-to-governments-in-civil-wars/. 
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Additionally, the orthodox claim that actions by individuals are per 
se beyond the reach of international law—and thus it is conceptually 
impossible, as a matter of legal theory, to restrict resorts to force by 
opposition groups—has long been discredited not only in jurisprudential 
terms,99 but also by modern practice. For instance, the growing body of 
international criminal law imposes obligations on individuals and confers 
rights on victims.100 Likewise, it is nowadays a consensus that during 
hostilities, treaty and customary IHL binds not only states, but also 
nonstate actors.101 Indeed, if international law presumes to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities in noninternational armed conflicts, there is no 
conceptual barrier to regulation of noninternational resort to hostilities. 
Both levels require assessment of highly complex decisions undertaken 
by states and nonstate actors alike. In this context, the reach of 
international law into the substate levels is also evident in the practice of 
the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council’s imposition of sanctions 
on individuals and nonstate entities has become a regular feature of the 
international system.102 Recently, however, the Council has gone further: 
not only did it single out certain opposition groups as culprits, and call 
upon governments to act against them,103 but it has also urged nonstate 
actors to “commit to combating” other armed groups.104 
In sum, considering the detrimental effects of civil wars, the current 
legal regime’s incoherence with regard to the use of force is glaring. As 
demonstrated above, nowadays, there are no substantial theoretical 
barriers to extend the law on the use of force to the internal sphere. This 
is because the traditional challenges to the international regulation of 
internal resort to force—sovereignty, self-determination, and the 
 
 99. See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 97 (1952) (“Like all law, 
international law, too, is a regulation of human conduct. It is to men that the norms of international 
law apply; it is against men that they provide sanctions . . . [the traditional view that only states are 
subjects of international law] is untenable.”); Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law and Human 
Rights ch. 2 (1950) (discussing individuals as subjects of international law). 
 100. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (granting the Court jurisdiction over persons); id. art. 75 (concerning reparations to victims). 
 101. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135; see also Dinstein, supra note 11, at 63–73 (explaining “why” IHL binds nonstate actors). 
 102. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, ¶ 4 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 103. See S.C. Res. 1746, ¶ 25 (Mar. 23, 2007) (calling upon the Afghan government and the 
international community to “address the threat” of the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and other groups); see also 
Ezequiel Heffes et al., Addressing Armed Opposition Groups Through Security Council Resolutions: A 
New Paradigm? 18 Max Planck Y.B. U.N. L. 32 (2014). 
 104. S.C. Res. 2139, ¶ 14 (Feb. 22, 2014) (“Strongly condemns the increased terrorist attacks . . . 
carried out by organizations and individuals associated with Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist 
groups, urges the opposition groups to maintain their rejection of these organizations and individuals 
which are responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law . . . calls upon the Syrian 
authorities and opposition groups to commit to combating and defeating organizations and individuals 
associated with Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist groups.”). 
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exclusion of individuals as international legal subjects—are no longer 
convincing in themselves. 
II.  A Revisionist Approach Toward Internal JUS AD BELLUM 
A. Revisionist Just War Theory and Internal Resort to Hostilities 
The previous Part argued that an international legal regime which 
presumes a freedom of internal resort to force is untenable. What, then, 
are the proper theoretical and ethical grounds through which to assess 
possible legal restrictions on such actions? In terms of just war theory, 
the key question is how to define a just cause for internal hostilities, 
whether by governments or opposition. Before formulating a response, 
we first have to address a preliminary question: whether different basic 
rules on resort to force should apply to governments, peoples, groups, or 
individuals. This discussion invokes a major clash in the field of just war 
theory in the past two decades, between traditionalists and revisionists. 
Traditional just war thought assumes that the state possesses special 
transcendental rights, perhaps best explained as a form of political 
theology.105 These essential characteristics might allow the state to resort 
to force where it would be morally dubious for any other actor to do so. 
International legal orthodoxy, accordingly, holds that on the interstate 
level, a state is entitled to (proportionately) repel any forcible 
encroachment upon its sovereignty or territorial integrity106—
presumably, even when the first aggression does not result in loss of 
life.107 Possible examples could be “aerial incursions,”108 cross-border 
minesweeping activities,109 or situations in which an empty territory is 
occupied. How can such a right to kill, with no clear-cut threat to life, be 
justified as necessary and proportional? While some philosophers offer 
competing, ever complex justifications for countering such “lesser 
aggressions” by force,110 others outright deny its moral plausibility.111 
 
 105. See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 36 
(George Schwab trans., 2005); Paul W. Kahn, Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty 1–30 (2011). 
 106. See Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are 
“Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from the UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 Am. J. Int’l L. 159, 189 (2014). 
 107. For instance, when an “invasion” occurs. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) art. 3(a) (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 108. See Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 240 
(1994). 
 109. The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 13 (Apr. 9). 
 110. The most convincing of which, in my eyes, being that in the usual course of events, when an 
aggressor in fact invades a state’s territory by force, the chances are so high that it would use lethal 
force to protect its gains, that force is justified in anticipation of the aggressor’s imminent forcible 
reaction. See Jeff McMahan, War as Self-Defense, 18 Eth. & Int’l Aff. 75, 77–79 (2004) [hereinafter 
McMahan, War as Self-Defense] (discussing self-defense in cases of “lesser aggression”). But see Jeff 
McMahan, What Rights May Be Defended by Means of War, in The Morality of Defensive War, 
supra note 13, at 115, 148 [hereinafter McMahan, What Rights May Be Defended] (modifying his 
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Nonetheless, the legal orthodoxy resolves this question through a simple 
analogy between the state and a physical person. Sovereignty and 
territorial integrity are thus fictionalized as the personal autonomy and 
physical body of the state, any violation of which justifies forcible 
repelling.112 Now, since under most conventional thought, individuals are 
not permitted to kill for every violation of autonomy or even of physical 
integrity, the orthodox view assigns to states broader rights than those 
enjoyed by the sum of the physical persons forming them. It thus 
presumes that a state exists independently of the persons that comprise it 
and thus enjoys additional rights they do not possess as individuals.113 
Granted, it is possible to argue that states bear different rights since they, 
as opposed to individuals, are in an anarchic “state of nature.”114 But 
even if that would be true, this can only explain why they are entitled to 
resort to self-help to secure their rights (as a secondary norm), not why 
they are entitled to resort to hostilities even when no life is immediately 
threatened (as a primary norm).115 
That human beings, by operating collectively—and particularly in 
the context of war—become subject to a different moral paradigm, is 
indeed a common trait of traditional just war reasoning.116 Some of this 
reasoning is rooted in duty-based doctrines that afforded special moral 
status to rulers and holders of public office,117 perhaps as representatives 
of God.118 Newer approaches tend to emphasize the political, arguing that 
rules governing the resort to force by individuals, groups, peoples, or 
 
argument); Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing ch. 5 (2014); see also Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitanism 
and Wars of Self-Defence, in The Morality of Defensive War, supra note 13, at 90; Seth Lazar, 
National Defence, Self-Defence and the Problem of Political Aggression, in The Morality of 
Defensive War, supra note 13, at 11. For a justification based on states as protectors of individual 
rights, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 54 (4th ed. 2006), which grounds national self-
defense on the claim that states protect the rights of their citizens and thus attack on the state is an 
attack on individual rights, and see Yitzhak Benbaji, Distributive Justice, Human Rights, and 
Territorial Integrity: A Contractarian Account of the Crime of Aggression, in The Morality of 
Defensive War, supra note 13, at 159, which examines the rationale of the limited permissibility of 
waging war only to defend legitimate state borders or on behalf of national defense. 
 111. David Luban, The Romance of the Nation-State, 9 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 392 (1980); David Rodin, 
The Myth of National Self-Defense, in The Morality of Defensive War, supra note 13, at 81. 
 112. See Walzer, supra note 110, at 58 (discussing “the legalist paradigm”). For a critical overview 
of this approach in international law, see David Rodin, War and Self-Defense 103–10 (2002). 
 113. See Kelsen, supra note 113, at 100–14 (vigorously deconstructing this perception). 
 114. For a classic view on interstate relations as anarchic, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics ch. 6 (1979). 
 115. That is, unless we adopt the Hobbesian position of the state of nature as a per se state of war. 
See Hobbes, supra note 52, ch. 13. But if this is our view of the international system, we must reject the 
plausibility of international law to begin with. 
 116. Jeff McMahan, Killing in War 15, 35–37, 79–84 (2009). 
 117. See, e.g., Pufendorf, supra note 52, at 718 (justifying a duty of nonresistance based on the 
Prince’s “high and noble office”). For a critique, see Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitanism, Just War Theory 
and Legitimate Authority, 84 Int’l Aff. 963 (2008). 
 118. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
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states are intrinsically different, since collective action implies political 
motivation. As put by Christopher Kutz, “[w]hen individuals’ wills are 
linked together in politics . . . this affects the normative valence of what 
they do individually as part of that politics.”119 Such collectivist views 
would find no special problem in formulating different rules on resort to 
lethal force based on political standing. For instance, while individuals 
would only be permitted to kill in defense of life against imminent 
unlawful threats, armed groups can fight for democracy, peoples can kill 
to achieve self-determination, and states can resort to internal hostilities 
in order to safeguard their sovereignty as such. 
However, the collectivist underpinnings of traditional just war 
theory have been increasingly challenged by a revisionist approach, 
spearheaded by Jeff McMahan. The revisionists’ basic claim is that war, 
simply by virtue of being an act of mass violence, is not governed by a 
morality different from any other human action, and thus, when it comes 
to killing, the same ethics apply to individuals and collectives.120 This view 
has dramatic consequences in many aspects of just war theory. Most 
importantly, it affects the traditional assumption of a moral equality—
and thus the equal liability to attack—of “just” and “unjust” combatants.121 
For us, however, the relevant point is that revisionists convincingly reject 
collectivist approaches to the morality of war. As McMahan points out, 
that people merely by acting “politically” through groups, are morally 
entitled to do what they are prohibited from as individuals is an 
unacceptable form of “moral alchemy.”122 Now, if collectives and individuals 
are subject to the same “morality of killing,” this must mean that the same 
moral standards concerning resort to hostilities should apply to governments 
and rebel groups.123 
 
 119. Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and 
War, 33 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 148, 156 (2005), cited in McMahan, supra note 116, at 81. 
 120. See Frowe, supra note 110, at 2; McMahan, supra note 116, ch. 2. 
 121. McMahan, supra note 116, at 1–15, 35. McMahan suggests that liability to attack must follow 
moral responsibility, and thus challenges the traditional approach, mainly represented by Michael 
Walzer. See Walzer, supra note 110. Walzer assumes that “just” combatants can be killed by “unjust” 
combatants merely because they represent a threat, without reference to the justness of their cause. Id. 
 122. McMahan, supra note 116, at 82. Of course, there are those who disagree. See, e.g., Rodin, 
supra note 112, at 6 (challenging the reductive approach to self-defense). But see McMahan, supra 
note 110 (rebutting these challenges). 
 123. Interestingly, traces of the equality of rulers and rebels, for this purpose, is found already in 
John Locke, to whom once force is used, “war levels the parties” and cancels our any relations of 
“reverence, respect, and superiority.” John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 235 (Richard 
H. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1689) (“But to resist force with force, being the state of war 
that levels the parties, cancels all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and then the 
odds that remains, is, that he, who opposes the unjust aggressor, has this superiority over him, that he 
has a right, when he prevails, to punish the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and all the evils 
that followed upon it.”). Nonetheless, I set aside, for now, second-order epistemological 
considerations that might advantage governments in such situations. Indeed, epistemological 
considerations have significant pedigree in writings that embrace the preference of rulers in the 
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B. Reductive Individualism and the Self-Defense Standard 
 Having established the view that internal jus ad bellum should be 
discussed under the assumption of equal moral rules, we still need to 
address the question of just cause: when are individuals, groups, peoples, 
or states justified in resorting to hostilities? Most revisionist theorists 
approach this issue through the technique of “reductive individualism.” 
First, they inquire when individuals are permitted to resort to lethal 
force. Unsurprisingly, the most widely accepted answer, in ethics and 
law, is that individuals are only allowed to kill in self-or other-defense 
against an unjustified grave harm, subject to necessity and proportionality 
limitations.124 Once establishing this baseline, revisionists proceed to apply 
this standard to collectives. Using increasingly complex factual scenarios, 
they describe war as nothing more than a web of forcible actions in self-
or-other-defense.125 Importantly, revisionists do not deny that war carries 
with it especially difficult conditions. They concede that during war, the 
right to self-defense might materialize in wider circumstances than in 
“regular” scenarios, namely because the nature of the threat emanating 
from the enemy’s combatants is continuous,126 and the fog of war results 
in significant epistemological challenges.127 But these are factual, not 
ethical distinctions. 
 
context of resort to internal armed force. See, e.g., Pufendorf, supra note 52, at 718, 720–21 (“[T]he 
acts of civil government are for the most part so obscure, that the multitude cannot apprehend the 
equity or the necessity of them.”). This argument is also made by Hobbes, who claimed that subjects 
are incapable of understanding complex and long-term policy. See Hobbes, supra note 52, ch. XVIII 
(“[A]ll men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses (that is their passions and self-love) 
through which every little payment appeareth a great grievance, but are destitute of those prospective 
glasses (namely moral and civil science) to see afar off the miseries that hang over them and cannot 
without such payments be avoided.”). But see McMahan, supra note 116, at 66–70 (questioning the 
epistemological advantages of governments). Yet, even if epistemological considerations should be 
taken into account, it would at most result in a factual presumption in favor of governments, but would 
not challenge the primary rule itself. See infra Part V. 
 124. See Frowe, supra note 110, at 1–3. It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a lengthy 
defense of the self-defense standard itself, both as an enabling and constraining one. As an enabling 
standard, it is recognized as a basic law of nature even in the dark state of nature of Hobbes. See 
Hobbes, supra note 52, ch. 14. In its constraining role, it can be justified both through deontological 
reasoning and consequentialist analysis, which would emphasize the negative results of a more 
permissive rule. For a discussion in light of Kantian ethics, see Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Justified 
Killing: The Paradox of Self-Defense 2, 50–52 (2009). 
 125. See Fabre, supra note 6, at 65–71; Frowe, supra note 110, at 1–3, 123–24; McMahan, supra 
note 110, at 75–76. For a critique, see David Luban, Human Rights Thinking and the Laws of War, in 
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights 32–33 (Jens David Ohlin ed., 
forthcoming). 
 126. McMahan, War as Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 76 (arguing that it is permissible, for 
instance, to kill sleeping soldiers since “[w]ar involves threats that consist of activities organized in 
phases over extended periods of time”). 
 127. McMahan, supra note 116, at 157. Janina Dill thus refers to war as an “epistemically cloaked 
forced choice” regarding the protection of individual rights. Janina Dill, Should International Law 
Ensure the Moral Acceptability of War?, 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 253, 254 (2013). 
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This standard can be adapted to the internal realm as well and 
accordingly shape international legal doctrine. As convincingly argued by 
Cécile Fabre, when it comes to killing, “the geographical location of a 
conflict (as within or across borders) and the political status of its actors 
are irrelevant to the determination of the latter’s rights, duties and 
liabilities.”128 Granted, conflicts within a single political community—in 
particular considering the asymmetry between governments and other 
actors—might raise some complex and salient issues that might not be 
relevant to interstate contexts.129 Arguably, these can require some 
modifications in our reasoning, when moving from the individual to the 
collective, and from the external to the internal. However, in legal terms, 
these modifications would be in the form of presumptions in favor of this 
or that factual or legal conclusion: it would not modify the basic rule that 
internal resort to hostilities is prohibited, unless undertaken for self-or-
other-defense. 
Additionally, when constructing the scope of the right to self-
defense, further adaptations must be made when moving from the realm 
of ethics to that of law. In ethics, some claim that killing in self-or-other-
defense could be permitted even against several grave nonlethal threats, 
including perhaps, “theft of property if the effect on the owner’s well-
being would be profound,”130 forms of “political” aggression,131 and threats 
emanating not from direct lethal force but from severe deprivation of 
material resources.132 When applying utilitarian ethics, some might even 
justify the resort to force in other circumstances, provided it would 
constitute a “lesser evil.”133 However, in law, considerations of legal policy 
such as the need for clarity, the problem of slippery slope, potential of 
abuse and manipulation, and the danger of false subjective judgment 
play a constraining role in the normative design.134 In other words, when 
 
 128. Fabre, supra note 6, at 131. At this point an objection can be made that this reasoning 
invalidates the basic idea that a state must enjoy a monopoly over the use of violence, thereby leading 
to anarchy. See Weber, supra note 14. However, if we recognize any form of a legitimate right to self-
defense by individuals—as all legal systems do—then we actually admit that this monopoly is not 
really absolute to begin with. That is to say, my suggestion does not really challenge the prevailing 
Weberian idea of state monopoly on violence since that monopoly never precluded self-defense. 
Indeed, even under Hobbes’ unlimited Leviathan individuals retained the right to self-defense. See 
Glenn Burgess, On Hobbesian Resistance Theory, in XLII Political Studies 62, 63–65 (1994); Peter J. 
Steinberger, Hobbesian Resistance, 46 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 856, 856–57 (2002). 
 129. Fabre, supra note 6, at 135–48 (discussing and rejecting the claims that a “special 
relationship” between the state and individuals, or the fact that insurgents have no formal political 
status, substantially affects the question of resort to force). 
 130. McMahan, War as Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 79. 
 131. See, e.g., Frowe, supra note 110, at 139–45. 
 132. Fabre, supra note 6, ch. 3 (discussing “severe deprivation” as a just cause for war). 
 133. Cf. Dill, supra note 127, at 259–60. 
 134. For these reasons, the U.N. Charter’s Article 51 restricts interstate self-defense to situations 
of an “armed attack” and not to other types of nonphysical threats. See, e.g., Tom Ruys, “Armed 
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resort to force is involved, law should be more wary of a system that 
opens the door for false positives. Perhaps, this is even more so in the 
complex, asymmetric environment of intrastate relations. This is not to 
say that the full spectrum of morality has no place in the legal discourse: 
in law, the distinction between what is permissible legally and what could 
be permissible morally is and ought to be reflected in the distinction 
between ex ante permission versus ex post defenses.135 This Article, 
however, focuses on the general rule, not on possible ex post excuses. 
III.  Collectivist Visions of Internal JUS AD BELLUM 
We are now in the position to explore international legal doctrine in 
light of the general ethical standard suggested above, as well as other 
relevant considerations. This Part discusses doctrines that might reflect 
collectivist visions of internal jus ad bellum and reveals why these are 
unsatisfactory as legal standards. 
A. Self-Determination  
In the post-Charter years, the international system was plagued by 
Cold War struggles and heightened tensions between crumbling empires 
and anticolonialist movements.136 In this environment, the prohibition on 
the use of force, as enshrined in the Charter’s Article 2(4), clearly failed 
to provide answers to one of the most pressing question of the times—
chiefly, the role of force in the relations between stability and revolution, 
and between the principles of territorial integrity of states versus self-
determination of peoples.137 Simply reiterating that the Charter reaffirmed 
the preexisting silence toward noninternational resorts to force could not 
satisfy the complex interests concerning these questions, neither those of 
anticolonial movements nor of states. Complete silence could not serve 
anticolonial movements, since it meant that states were free to forcibly 
suppress any struggle for self-determination, without international legal 
consequence. Accordingly, they pressed for rules to prohibit such 
forcible actions; rules that can be understood as correlating with aspects 
of jus ad bellum.138 But silence was also problematic for major Cold War 
 
Attack” and Article 51 of the UN Charter 55–56, 183, 324 (2010). One would be hard-pressed to 
argue for a wider standard when discussing internal self-defense. 
 135. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949, 958 (1985) 
(discussing excuse and justification defenses in criminal law). In the international context, see 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report 164 (2000) (differentiating 
between ex ante unlawfulness and possible ex post legitimacy in the discussion of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention). 
 136. See Moyn, supra note 8, at 94. 
 137. See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 197 (1995). 
 138. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations (Oct. 24, 1970) (“Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives 
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powers, since it assumed the freedom to forcibly repress democratic 
change on the one hand, and socialist revolution on the other.139 To 
further complicate the map of interests, both bloc powers and 
anticolonial movements—which envisioned themselves as future 
sovereigns—were well aware that limiting resort to force by rulers, for 
whatever reason, is a double-edged sword: indeed, armed rebellion could 
also be directed against themselves or their allies.140 
These mutually offsetting interests prompted international lawyers 
to construct ways to control noninternational resorts to force without 
explicitly regulating intrastate armed violence. The chief method to do so 
was to dodge the question by excluding certain conflicts from the internal 
realm to begin with. Repeatedly, therefore, rival blocs condemned 
internal conflicts as inauthentic proxy wars. If a certain conflict was not 
truly internal, preferring one side over the other—governments or 
rebels—could be justified without making a clear determination on the 
limits of internal jus ad bellum.141 The Reagan Doctrine, for instance, was 
constructed as a response against “Soviet supported aggression,”142 and 
was phrased by one of its key theorists, Jeane Kirkpatrick, as a 
counterintervention in a case where a totalitarian government was 
maintained by “foreign forces.”143 Similarly, the Soviet Brezhnev Doctrine, 
which was used to bolster or contain internal revolutions or resorts to 
force, frequently relied on previous Western intervention in order to 
discredit the “authenticity” of the conflict.144 
Like proxy wars, anticolonial struggles for self-determination were 
also excluded from the internal sphere. This granted them some measure 
of legitimacy, without jeopardizing sovereignty or territorial integrity and 
without saying anything about internal resort to force. Thus, for instance, 
the U.N. General Assembly, in its 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, stated that “[t]he territory of a colony or other Non-Self-
Governing Territory has . . . a status separate and distinct from the 
 
peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination.”); G.A. 
Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, ¶ 4, 
(Dec. 16, 1960) (“All armed action . . . directed against dependent peoples shall cease . . .”); see also 
Cassese, supra note 137, at 194–97; Shaw, supra note 83, at 44. 
 139. See Falk, supra note 79, at 6–7 (exemplifying during the Cold War that “[i]n a period of 
revolutionary ferment any given government . . . will sometimes favor the incumbent and sometimes 
the insurgent, depending on the setting”). 
 140. See Moyn, supra note 8, at 84–119 (discussing the preoccupation of anticolonialist movements 
with sovereignty). 
 141. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 169–72; Falk, supra note 79, at 3. 
 142. Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the 
State of the Union (Feb. 6, 1985). 
 143. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International 
Law, in Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force 19, 20 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1991). 
 144. This was the case, for instance, in the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary. See 1956 U.N.Y.B. 
67–69, U.N. Sales No. 1957.I.1. 
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territory of the State administering it.”145 Similarly, in a 1975 resolution, 
the Institut de Droit International, excluded from the term “civil war” 
“conflicts arising from decolonization.”146 This tendency was reflected 
also in Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I, which classified 
international armed conflicts for the purpose of IHL as “armed conflicts 
in which peoples are fighting . . . in the exercise of their right of self-
determination.”147 To further shield the internal realm against self-
determination struggles, international discourse made clear that generally, in 
situations beyond anticolonial struggles, the conservative principles of 
national unity, territorial integrity, nonintervention, and sovereignty still 
held sway.148 
However, the exclusion of anticolonial struggles from the internal 
realm cannot end the debate on self-determination and internal force. 
This is because the right to self-determination applies to all peoples, even 
beyond the colonial context.149 Can peoples thus resort to internal force 
when the right to self-determination is deprived of them? It is helpful to 
note that even concerning anticolonial self-determination struggles, this 
point proved controversial. The Declaration on Friendly Relations, as 
well as other relevant documents, recognized that peoples have a right to 
resist forcible action depriving them of self-determination, and that they 
are entitled to receive support in such resistance, but only in accordance 
with the principles of the U.N. Charter.150 While most “Third World” 
states understood this formulation as recognizing the right to use force 
against the mere existence of colonial regimes, many Western states 
maintained that it only goes as far as to acknowledge that such a right 
exists in response to forcible suppression actions by the colonial power.151 
Although it is tempting to deride the Western approach as the dying 
breath of empire—and this would be at least partially true—it has its 
ethical merits. As discussed earlier on, assuming that equal morality 
applies to individuals and collectives, merely having a primary “right” to 
 
 145. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 138. Until the mid-twentieth century, anticolonial struggles were 
considered, for the purpose of international law, as internal conflicts. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at 
220–21; Shaw, supra note 83, at 43–44. 
 146. Institut de Droit International, The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars art. 1(2)(c) 
(Aug. 14, 1975). 
 147. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (June 8 1977). 
 148. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 138, arts. 6–7; see also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to 
Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 46, 54 (1992) (noting the self-determination “evolved in a 
way that did not legitimate self-determination of minorities within a colony”). 
 149. All peoples enjoy the right to self-determination. See ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 1(1). 
 150. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 138; G.A. Res 3314, supra note 107, art. 7 (referring to the right to 
“struggle” for self-determination); see also Shaw, supra note 83, at 44. 
 151. See Shaw, supra note 83, at 44–45; see also Cassese, supra note 137, at 197–98; Corten, supra 
note 10, at 22. For a comprehensive discussion, see Heather A. Wilson, International Law and the 
Use of Force by National Liberation Movements (1988). 
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something—self-determination or otherwise—does not necessarily entail 
also a secondary right to kill to acquire it. For instance, we might agree 
that if country A deprives people B of education in their native language, 
A violates B’s right to self-determination. But we would most certainly 
object that B is thereby justified to spark a civil war due to this 
deprivation. This hypothetical reveals a key limitation of self-
determination as an independent baseline for internal jus ad bellum: the 
fact that in actuality, it encompasses a spectrum of rights, the violation of 
which is of varying degrees of severity. Indeed, in the post-colonial era, 
this feature of self-determination was made abundantly clear, as the 
principle was constructed as a bundle of liberal democratic human 
rights.152 Assigning a right to resort to force, thus, for any violation of 
self-determination, seems too permissive.153 
What violation of the rights comprising self-determination would, if 
at all, justify internal resort to force? Clearly, it would be needed to 
demonstrate that a threat emanating from a particular deprivation of 
self-determination would be so grave as to justify the right to kill. 
Granted, even some revisionist philosophers concede that sometimes it is 
morally justified to use force against deprivation of political self-
determination.154 However, I have already noted that due to considerations 
of abuse and the danger of false positives, when constructing ex ante 
permissions to use force, a legal regime should be more restrictive. Phrased 
in this manner, it becomes clear that a deprivation of internal self-
determination must be so severe as to constitute an imminent grave threat, 
which actually merges with the self-defense standards suggested above. 
In sum, while it is rather obvious to conclude that states are prohibited 
from resorting to force in violation of the right to self-determination—both 
in positive international law and a fortiori according to the restrictive, 
self-defense standards suggested here—it is equally problematic to 
invoke self-determination, in itself, as an enabling norm for armed rebellion 
in the absence of a threat giving rise to the right to self-or-other-defense. 
B. Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity Versus Secession 
What about situations outside the context of colonial struggles—
which are generally understood as international—or in which a party 
attempts unilateral secession? Does the international law concerning 
 
 152. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.); Franck, supra note 148, at 52–
56, 58–59; see also Moyn, supra note 8, at 208 (situating the shift from anticolonial perceptions of self-
determination to individual rights-based perceptions). 
 153. Cf. McMahan, What Rights May Be Defended, supra note 110, at 134–35. 
 154. See Fabre, supra note 110, at 99–114 (justifying war against deprivation of self-determination 
where it is clear that severe human rights violations are imminent, or when the deprivation amounts to 
a “conditional threat”). Note, however, that this approach essentially deconstructs deprivation of self-
determination into self-defense. See also Fabre, supra note 6, at 138–39. 
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secession tell us something also about the right to resort to force? Today, 
it is fairly settled that international law does not recognize a right to 
unilateral secession, and that the principle of territorial integrity trumps 
most countervailing interests.155 This is clearly reflected in the 
international outrage concerning Crimea’s recent attempt to secede from 
Ukraine, even if we assume that it was the genuine will of Crimea’s 
Russian majority.156 Likewise, although the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”), in a 2010 Advisory Opinion, opined that Kosovo’s 2008 
unilateral declaration of independence was not contrary to international 
law, the grounds for the opinion were very narrow: it focused on the act 
of declaring independence itself, not on the broader issue of Kosovo’s 
right to secede from Serbia.157 
But what if, in a certain instance, there is a collective right to secede 
under international law? Does this also entail a right to use force to fulfill 
it? Assume that province B within State A seeks to secede. Assume 
further that the U.N. Security Council adopted a binding Chapter VII 
Resolution recognizing, in principle, B’s right to secede, and that the 
Security Council was acting within its powers to do so.158 State A does not 
comply with the Resolution; however, being an otherwise reasonable 
state, it does not resort to hostilities to prevent it, but rather uses its 
justice system to prosecute separatists. Does this grant B a right to resort 
to hostilities to give effect to the Resolution? The answer must be no, 
since a positive reply again conflates a right to something with a right to 
kill in order to secure it.159 Just as individual residents of province B 
would not have a right to kill upon every violation of international norms 
by A, they cannot do so collectively through their political representation 
as a province. Of course, our analysis might change completely if we 
accept the (controversial) doctrine of “remedial secession,” which 
recognizes a right of unilateral secession in cases of grave human rights 
violations by the rump state.160 In facts giving rise to such a right, we 
might accept that B resort to force to effect secession; but this resort 
would not be permissible because of the right to secede itself, but rather 
 
 155. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 152; G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 138; see also 
Christian Walter, Postscript: Self-Determination, Secession and the Crimean Crisis 2014, in Self-
Determination and Secession in International Law 293, 306 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2014). 
 156. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 68/263, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine (Apr. 1, 2014). But see Vladimir 
Putin, President of Russia, Address by President of the Russ. Federation (Mar. 18, 2014). 
 157. Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 11, ¶¶ 78–121. 
 158. The closest “real life” situation can be found in Resolution 1244, in which the U.N. Security 
Council effectively transferred the administration of Kosovo to the international community. Whether 
this amounted to recognition of a right to secede is of course debatable. See S.C. Res. 1244 (June 10, 1999). 
 159. Indeed, this conclusion seems to conform to state practice in recent decades, condemning 
forcible attempts at secession. For a brief analysis, see for example Antonello Tancredi, Secession and 
Use of Force, in Self-Determination and Secession in International Law, supra note 155, at 68, 72–75. 
 160. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 152, ¶ 134; Walter, supra note 155, at 306–07. 
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due to the nature of the threat caused by A, which also gives rise to a 
right to self-defense. 
Now let us assume that B fails to receive a Security Council 
authorization, but unilaterally declares independence, and even moves to 
organize its governmental agencies, including by establishing 
rudimentary security forces. Can State A attack B to stop such actions? 
Even if we assume that B has no right to secede under international law, 
there is no reason to assume a priori that its actions militate a forcible 
response.161 Indeed, some international jurisprudence implies that 
governments, in certain circumstances, are under a duty to regain control 
over their territories in order to fulfill their human rights obligations.162 
But this cannot be construed as a duty or an unqualified authorization to 
resort to hostilities to do so—as the proper choice of means must be 
heavily dependent on the circumstances.163 For instance, the proper 
choice of means can hinge on the question of whether loss of control is a 
factual, passive product of state failure, or conversely, of active forcible 
action by rebels against government forces.164 Returning to our 
hypothetical, perhaps State A can use its police or judiciary to restore 
law and order, and thus refrain from killing; that is, unless B resorts to 
hostilities first, and therefore A’s hostilities can be justified in self-or-
other-defense. This seems entirely commonsensical. Recall, that even in 
the American Civil War, the Union formally resorted to hostilities 
against the seceding Confederacy not in response to the secession itself, 
but only when the Confederacy resisted Union presence by force, 
famously by attacking Fort Sumter in April 12, 1861.165 
In sum, assuming a collective right to secession exists, a right to 
resort to force does not necessarily follow—unless the right to secede is a 
result of grave human rights violations. But in such case we are really 
talking about force in self-defense, not force for the purpose of secession 
per se. In the same vein, the legitimacy of a resort to force to prevent 
secession would hinge on a first resort to hostilities by the seceding 
party—meaning, on the existence of a just case of self-defense—not on 
 
 161. In a sense, such a situation mirrors the theoretical problem of “bloodless aggression” on the 
international level. See Fabre, supra note 110, at 103–09. 
 162. See Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1134, ¶¶ 331-33, 340 cited in Tancredi, supra 
note 159, at 69–70. 
 163. Cf. Ilaşcu, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 340–52. In general, the Court referred to the duty to 
“act by taking all the political, judicial, and other measures at its disposal to reestablish its control.” Id. 
¶ 340. 
 164. See Lieblich, supra note 15, at 138. 
 165. See Gary Gallagher et al., Civil War: Fort Sumter to Appomattox 31–33 (2014); see also 
Stephen C. Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War 16–17 (2010); 
Quincy Wright, The American Civil War, in The International Law of Civil War, supra note 12, at 
30, 42; see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 669 (1863) (stressing the hostile nature of 
Confederate action as a trigger to the Civil War). 
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the right to safeguard territorial integrity as such. Any other result 
assumes a discontinuity of morality when moving from the individual to 
the collective. 
C. Democratic Legitimacy  
Does the character of a regime affect the question of internal jus ad 
bellum? Indeed, governmental legitimacy is a tempting prism through 
which to analyze internal resorts to force. In liberal discourse, legitimacy 
interacts closely with the idea of rule by consent. Applied to the issue at 
hand, such an approach would equalize a totalitarian regime with an 
aggressor. Accordingly, a democratic government would be entitled to 
resort to various measures—including, perhaps, to force—to protect 
itself against antidemocratic elements, while nondemocratic regimes 
would be prohibited from taking such measures against democratic 
opposition.166 Taken seriously, such an approach would also justify armed 
rebellion against nondemocratic regimes and prohibit such force against 
democratic governments. In short, the principled question under democratic 
theory is whether the existence of democracy or authoritarianism alone can 
affect the law on internal resort to force, or whether something additional 
is needed. 
Of course, to argue for such a legal rule requires saying something 
about the status of democratic governance as a right under international 
law, and also about the consequences of its breach. Indeed, in the 1990s, 
just after the collapse of the iron curtain, the triumph of the liberal 
democratic order seemed absolute, as the nations of the former Warsaw 
Pact emerged as reborn democracies.167 These (and other) developments 
have famously led Thomas Franck to proclaim that a “right to 
democratic governance”—a “democratic entitlement”—was emerging 
under customary international law.168 In essence, Franck celebrated a 
new Pax Americana built around the “almost-complete triumph of the 
democratic notions of Hume, Locke, Jefferson and Madison.”169 
Although, in hindsight, the celebratory tone was a tad immature, 
Franck was careful enough to remain vague about the legal implications 
of his claim. Although some suggested that the democratic entitlement 
spawned a right of unilateral armed intervention by third parties when a 
 
 166. For a general discussion, see Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, in 
Democratic Governance and International Law 389 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) 
(discussing the powers under international law of democracies to protect themselves through political 
exclusion, but not focusing on the issue of hostilities). 
 167. For a general account, see Central and East European Politics: From Communism to 
Democracy (Sharon L. Wolchik & Jane L. Curry eds., 2011); see also Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, 
Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy and its Implications for International Law, in 
Democratic Governance and International Law, supra note 166, at 1. 
 168. Franck, supra note 148. 
 169. Id. at 49. 
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democratic government was deposed,170 Franck mainly argued that the 
democratic entitlement meant that “only democracy and rule of law will 
be capable of validating governance”171 and that citizens would look to 
international law to guarantee that entitlement.172 Namely, this 
understanding implied a substantive theory of governmental recognition 
based on democratic credentials;173 yet, like the mainstream writing on the 
issue, Franck refrained from addressing the relations between democratic 
governance and internal resorts to force.174 
Indeed, if a democratic entitlement exists, it could be deduced that 
such an entitlement must prohibit antidemocratic coup d’états, as well as 
the repression of democratic opposition.175 If this is true, it must follow 
that armed activities undertaken for the purpose of achieving antidemocratic 
objectives would also be prohibited. In this sense, the democratic 
entitlement would entrench a general prohibition on the first resort to 
force, at least within the democratic order. This of course fits nicely with 
the general approach suggested here, that in any case force can be used 
only in self-or-other-defense. The democratic entitlement does not, 
however, say much about positive rights to use force, either by 
democratic governments for the purpose of protecting democracy, or by 
pro-democratic opposition in order to achieve it. 
Now, that democracies are entitled to defend their political 
systems—if needed by employing coercive measures—is beyond doubt.176 
However, this does not imply the right to resort to hostilities. Indeed, the 
situations in which democracies could be allowed to resort to internal 
hostilities—to killing—must be very narrowly defined, if they are not to 
lose their democratic character to begin with. It thus becomes clear that 
any rule regulating the resort to force would be less concerned with the 
existence of a threat to democracy, but rather with its gravity, or the 
means through which it is carried out. And the answer to the question 
 
 170. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 
in Democratic Governance and International Law, supra note 166, at 239. 
 171. Franck, supra note 148, at 49. 
 172. Id. at 50. 
 173. Fox & Roth, supra note 167, at 9–12 (discussing the democratic entitlement and the international 
law on recognition of governments). 
 174. See, e.g., id. at 11–13. 
 175. This notion is reflected in pro-democratic sanctions clauses entrenched in regional 
arrangements. See, e.g., Constitutive Act of the African Union arts. 4(m), 4(p), July 11, 2000, 2158 
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security of the African Union 
art. 4(j) (2002); Economic Community of West African States, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1999). 
For an analysis of these instruments and others, see Lieblich, supra note 67, at 198–99, 210–11. 
 176. For instance, in the European Convention on Human Rights, coercive restrictions on rights 
are usually limited to what is necessary in a democratic society. See Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 6(1), 8(2), 10(2), 11(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter ECHR]. 
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when such means could merit a forcible response cannot be phrased by 
reference to democracy itself, but to other first principles. 
Similarly, that oppressed people bear the right to overthrow 
authoritarian government is long entrenched in liberal political theory.177 
This is also undisputed under international law, even under traditional 
doctrine, not least because the latter presupposes an unlimited right of 
revolution.178 Nonetheless, even if a democratic entitlement exists, this in 
itself does not necessarily entail a right to resort to hostilities in order to 
achieve democracy. This is because even if the democratic entitlement 
implies a positive right to act, personally or collectively, and perhaps 
engage in civil disobedience in order to bring about democratic 
transition, it is debatable at best whether the permission to resort first to 
armed hostilities is inherent in such right. The contrary position would be 
to conflate the primary norm and the secondary norm meant to enforce 
it: the right to something with the right to kill to acquire it. If justified 
only on account of the political or collective nature of pro-democratic 
rebellion, it assumes that separate morality governs “political” actions—
a notion already rejected. Again, we need other, first principles, to 
explain when violations of democratic principles spawn a right to use armed 
force. 
The separation between ends and means, in this context, seems to 
conform to our intuitions. For instance, while the Egyptian pro-democratic 
revolution of 2011 was (almost) universally lauded,179 it is doubtful whether 
similar reactions would follow if instead of peacefully occupying Tahrir 
Square, the revolutionaries would have initiated a campaign of hostilities 
against the Egyptian military. This intuition is rooted precisely in the 
notion that the absence of democracy is not sufficient in itself to justify 
resort to massive killing. This intuition also correlates with the practice of 
democratic opposition movements as rational actors. Unsurprisingly, in 
the first (democratic) stages of the Arab Spring, neither in Egypt and 
Tunisia on the one hand, nor in Syria and Libya on the other, were 
organized hostilities initiated by the opposition. Rather, the organized 
armed opposition in Syria and Libya commenced only after the regimes 
themselves attacked the protesters with significant force.180 Perhaps these 
 
 177. See, e.g., Fox & Nolte, supra note 166, at 432. For a theoretical survey, see Ginsburg et al., 
supra note 22, at 1191–1207; see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule 
of law.”). 
 178. Lauterpacht, supra note 10, at 106–07. 
 179. See Hosni Mubarak Resigns: World Reaction, BBC News (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-middle-east-12435738. 
 180. For a timeline of the events in Syria, see Syria Profile—Timeline, BBC News (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995; see also David Poort & Ismaeel Naar, Timeline: 
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dynamics are unavoidable in practice: it is likely that authoritarian 
regimes will always resort to escalating levels of force when confronting 
even nonviolent challenges, since non-toleration of dissent is part and 
parcel of what makes them authoritarian to begin with.181 
Intuition, however, is not enough, as the idea of a right of armed 
rebellion against authoritarian regimes enjoys considerable pedigree in 
social-contractarian liberal thought. John Locke, for instance, did not 
constrain the right of forcible resistance only to cases of imminent and 
tangible threat to life, but also to situations of tyranny. To Locke, the 
state was a product of a social contract that aimed, by transferring 
executive power to the public, to lift individuals from the state of 
nature.182 The state rescues human society from the state of nature by 
functioning as a “judge on earth” between individuals.183 An absolute 
sovereign, conversely, cannot provide such redress and thus remains in 
the state of nature with his subjects.184 By appropriating absolute power, 
the ruler furthermore enters a state of war with the subjects.185 Thus, 
Locke does not substantively differentiate between cases of extreme 
danger caused by the ruler, usurpation or tyranny186: subjects have the 
right to resist in all of these cases, and such resistance must include 
aggressive force in order to be effective.187 
Importantly, Locke’s reasoning hinged on the idea that even if an 
absolutist prince has yet to endanger my person concretely, he might do 
so later on, if he manages to take my liberty188 or my property,189 and 
therefore I can act against him before a specific threat to life materializes. 
Should international law follow the Lockean idea of the right to resort to 
force when the democratic entitlement is violated? Returning to the 
reductivist approach, some contemporary philosophers claim that 
theoretically, individuals as well as collectives can resort to lethal force 
against severe deprivation of freedom or subsistence as defense against 
aggression.190 However, in truth, the vast majority of totalitarian 
regimes—abhorrent as they might be—do not exercise the same level of 
oppression that would justify killing in an individual setting. Most models 
 
Three Years After Libya’s Uprising, AlJazeera (May 19, 2014, 2:29 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/ 
indepth/interactive/2014/02/timeline-three-years-after-libya-uprising-201421691755192622.html. 
 181. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at 219. 
 182. Locke, supra note 123, chs. 8–9. 
 183. Id. ch. 7, § 89. 
 184. Id. ch. 7, §§ 90–93. 
 185. Id. ch. 3, § 17, ch. 19, § 222. 
 186. Id. ch. 18, § 199 (defining usurpation and tyranny). 
 187. Id. ch. 19, § 235 (“He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to strike.”). 
 188. Id. §§ 16–18 (“I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would 
not, when he had me in his power, take away everything else. And therefore it is lawful for me to treat 
him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can.”). 
 189. Id. ch. 19, §§ 221–22. 
 190. See, e.g., Fabre, supra note 6, at 105–10, 118–26; McMahan, supra note 116, at 79–81. 
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of totalitarian regimes, except the few outright murderous ones, can be 
better described as collective forms of “conditional threats”: the regime 
directly deprives its citizens of certain political rights, while indirectly 
threatening them that resistance would result in a much graver 
violation.191 Whether it would be justified to resist upon such “lesser” 
threats when knowing that resistance will prompt escalation and thus 
cause further harm, is an unresolved question in just war theory.192 
Nonetheless, we can at least agree that when facing such conditional 
threats, the victim should attempt a lesser form of resistance—such as 
civil disobedience and other nonviolent approaches—before embarking 
on hostilities as a last resort.193 
In international legal terms, Locke’s reasoning is reminiscent of the 
idea of preventive self-defense on the international level, which justifies 
a right to act preventatively against emerging threats.194 However, this 
doctrine was rejected by contemporary international legal discourse for 
good reasons, chiefly because it raises severe problems of unclear 
necessity, subjective judgment, abuse, and dangers of escalation.195 The 
Lockean idea clearly raises the same problems. Interestingly, these 
concerns were not lost on other classic thinkers who distinguished, when 
considering internal force, between cases of illegitimate rule versus cases 
of concrete and imminent danger. Grotius, for instance, argued that force 
could not be used against usurpers, when the latter do not present an 
extreme danger.196 Confronting usurpation, he argued, raises acute 
epistemological problems, since such situations are often too complex 
and “controverted” to allow sound factual judgment.197 In terms of cost-
benefit, Grotius argued that it might be preferable to leave the usurper 
 
 191. A “conditional threat” is a situation in which A demands of B to suffer harm C, under the 
threat that resistance will generate much greater harm D. A classic example of this type of conditional 
threat is a simple “your money or your life” street mugging. See Rodin, supra note 111, at 79–88. 
 192. Rodin claims, for instance, that it could be immoral to resist a lesser threat if we know that 
that the indirect grave threat would materialize, since that would make resistance disproportionate in 
terms of a cost/benefit analysis. See Rodin, supra note 111, at 81–82. But see Frowe, supra note 110, at 
129–45 (arguing that merely “foreseen” conditional harms should be discounted when discussing 
proportionality of self-defense; and in collective scenarios, the lesser harms should be considered in 
aggregation). 
 193. See, e.g., Fabre, supra note 110, at 109–11. 
 194. See Michael W. Doyle, Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International 
Conflict (Stephen Macedo ed., 2008). 
 195. See Ruys, supra note 134, at 322–24. Interestingly, Locke responds to the problems associated 
with preventive use of force by invoking the wisdom of the crowds. Locke believed that people are 
capable of such judgments just as private beneficiaries are capable of judging their trustee. Locke, 
supra note 123, ch. 19, § 240. Moreover, people are likely to rebel (or to support rebellion) only when 
faced with genuine and grave wrongs. Id. ch. 19, §§ 224–25, 230. 
 196. But see Grotius, supra note 47, at 378–80 (exploring the legality of deposing or killing an usurper). 
 197. Id. at 381–83. 
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“in quiet possession, than engage his country in dangerous troubles and 
bloody wars.”198 
Beyond the theoretical legal aspects above, there are additional 
practical reasons to reject democracy as the ultimate yardstick to assess 
internal resort to force both by states and opposition movements. The 
first is the likely objection that the term democracy might be understood 
as implying Western hegemony.199 This in itself can irreparably harm the 
concept’s legitimacy. Furthermore, even orthodox liberal theory 
recognizes that nowadays the democracy and authoritarianism dichotomy 
is too simplistic when constructing international relations, and that some 
gray areas of legitimacy exist—most notably in the form of the Rawlsian 
idea of “decent peoples.”200 But even if we reject such gray areas, the 
conceptual ambiguity of democracy remains. Indeed, defining democracy 
is far from simple, even if we can agree on its basic tenets.201 As the world 
is abundant with “flawed” democracies,202 it is not always clear when the 
threshold is crossed. History teaches us to be suspicious concerning the 
use of the term “democratic” as an empty vessel.203 Since any rule on the 
use of force—considering the stakes at hand—must aim to minimize the 
space for subjective interpretation, it should not be constructed around 
vague concepts. 
Finally, democratic entitlement is a weak analytical tool due to its 
collapse into other concepts; that is, unless we mythicize it as a collective, 
transcendental right. The term “democracy,” however defined, includes 
both procedural (electoral) aspects as well as substantive (rights-based) 
ones.204 If we focus on the existence of electoral democracy as a 
determinant for a right to use internal force, the resulting rule is 
unattractive, since majority rule is not sufficient, in itself, to secure 
human rights. If on the other hand, by democracy we do not mean only 
electoral process but also the protection of individual rights, then we 
inevitably venture into the open textured, culturally sensitive territory of 
human rights.205 Absent further elaboration, “human rights” is far too 
ambiguous a concept for the regulation of resort to hostilities and, in any 
 
 198. Id. at 381. Furthermore, the usurper’s acts might have binding (de facto) power, if not by law 
(de jure), simply by the fact that this would be preferable to “anarchy.” Id. at 377; see also Pufendorf, 
supra note 52, at 724–26. 
 199. See Fox & Roth, supra note 167, at 13–15. 
 200. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 59–88 (1999). 
 201. Jan Knippers Black, What Kind of Democracy Does the “Democratic Entitlement” Entail?, in 
Democratic Governance and International Law, supra note 166, at 517; Martti Koskenniemi, 
Intolerant Democracies: A Reaction, 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 231, 231–32 (1996). 
 202. See, e.g., Democracy Index 2013, Economist Intelligence Unit, http://www.eiu.com/public/ 
topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy0814 (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
 203. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at 216. 
 204. See id. at 210. 
 205. See id. at 217. 
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case, reveals that “democratic entitlement” is not an entirely distinct 
concept.206 
IV.  Individualist Visions: International Human Rights and Armed 
Conflict as a State of Exception 
Having demonstrated the failure of several international legal 
doctrines to form a basis for a theory of internal jus ad bellum, we can 
proceed to discuss ideas rooted in the protection of the individual. 
International human rights law seems better situated to control the resort 
to force, as it specifically sets out to prevent and curb intrastate violence. 
Since it is concerned with the protection of individuals, it fits more 
naturally with the revisionist just war ideas underlying our discussion. As 
shown in this Part, some contemporary human rights jurisprudence 
implies the adoption of the logic of reductivist individualism by applying, 
in general, the same norms of resort to force on the micro and macro 
levels of violence.207 However, IHRL’s effectiveness in this context is 
curbed both by doctrinal underdevelopment and its troubled relations with 
international humanitarian law. 
A. The Right to Life and Internal Hostilities 
IHRL’s potential to prohibit and regulate resort to internal force is 
mainly rooted in its protection of everyone’s right to life. Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), for 
instance, provides that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”208 
While no derogation from this right is permitted,209 the term “arbitrarily” 
implies that some exceptions are possible, such as deprivation of life 
during war.210 Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) presents a slightly different approach. It entrenches 
“everyone’s right to life,” but subjects it to several explicit exceptions.211 
Thus, Article 2(2) excludes deprivations of life resulting from defense of 
persons from unlawful violence;212 from action taken “in order to effect a 
lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;”213 or 
from “action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or 
insurrection.”214 These legitimate aims are limited by a means-ends 
 
 206. See id. at 217–19. 
 207. See William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court 
of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 741, 742–43 (2005). 
 208. ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 6(1); see also American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1) 
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 209. ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 4(2). 
 210. See infra Part V. 
 211. ECHR, supra note 176, art. 2(1). 
 212. Id. art. 2(2)(a). 
 213. Id. art. 2(2)(b). 
 214. Id. art. 2(2)(c). 
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proportionality constraint: the force used cannot be more “than 
absolutely necessary.”215 Furthermore, Article 15 of the ECHR allows 
derogations in times of emergency, including from the right to life, only 
“in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war.”216 It should 
already be clear that the “war” exceptions reflect a dichotomy between 
internal peace and war, without clearly regulating the movement between 
these realms. I treat this problem in the next section. For now, it suffices 
to note that this mirrors the pre-Charter law on international resort to 
force, which treated peace and war as two spheres between which a state 
could move freely.217 
IHRL can be used to assess the conduct of every state (and as we 
shall see, perhaps nonstate). Moreover, even those that deny IHRL’s 
application during armed conflict cannot rule out that it applies before 
armed conflict erupts. Therefore, there is no doubt that IHRL can 
regulate the initial decision to resort to armed force. However, this 
potential has been fulfilled only partially, if at all. Granted, IHRL has 
been extended to situations of internal armed conflicts by major human 
rights courts, notably the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”).218 In a string of cases relating to the Russian-Chechen 
conflict, the court moved to apply IHRL even in relation to core issues of 
jus in bello.219 Nonetheless, as demonstrated below, IHRL was not taken 
so far as to explicitly regulate the resort to force itself, meaning, the ad 
bellum level. If the issue was touched upon, it was only in passing 
references. In fact, the move by courts to assess the conduct of hostilities 
in light of human rights norms is more than anything a pragmatic 
solution to competence problems: IHRL is applied since it is unclear to 
what extent human rights courts are authorized to apply IHL directly.220 
 
 215. Id. art. 2(2). 
 216. Id. art. 15(2). 
 217. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 74–75. 
 218. By “extension” I do not refer to the joint application of IHL and IHRL during armed conflict 
but rather to the assessment of the conduct of hostilities in light of human rights law in lieu of IHL. See 
Andrea Gioia, The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Monitoring Compliance with 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, in Pas de Deux: International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law 201, 203 (Orna Ben Naftali ed., 2011) (noting that the ECtHR has 
often ignored IHL altogether, applying IHRL instead). 
 219. Id. at 218–20, 224–49. 
 220. Oona Hathaway et al., Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship 
Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1883, 1909–10 
(2012) (arguing that human rights courts exclude IHL due to jurisdictional issues). For a discussion of 
the jurisdictional problem in the Inter-American human rights system, see Shana Tabak, Armed 
Conflict and the Inter-American Human Rights System: Application or Interpretation of International 
Humanitarian Law?, in Applying International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-
Judicial Bodies: International and Domestic Aspects 219 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014), and see 
Gioia, supra note 218, at 215–18. Some claim that at least in internal conflicts, applying IHRL can be 
desirable, because IHL is less developed than human rights law when it comes to noninternational 
armed conflict. Abresch, supra note 207, at 747. 
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Moreover, by applying IHRL in lieu of IHL, courts could sidestep the 
often controversial question of whether an internal armed conflict 
existed in a particular situation.221 
The leading case, in this context, is the ECtHR’s Isayeva v. Russia.222 
In Isayeva, the applicant alleged, inter alia, that Russia violated Article 2 
(the right to life) of the ECHR, by indiscriminately bombing the 
Chechen village of Katyr-Yurt and killing her family members.223 Russia 
responded by invoking Article 2(2)(a), claiming that the bombing was 
absolutely necessary in defense of persons.224 It did not, however, claim 
that an armed conflict existed; nor did it make any derogation from the 
right to life,225 although Article 15’s derogations regime is relevant also to 
civil wars.226 This framing allowed the court to analyze the dispute as a 
“regular” human rights case. 
The court ruled first that the basic values of democratic societies 
must restrict the circumstances in which deprivation of life can be 
justified.227 In essence, this reflects a baseline of nonuse of force within 
intrastate relations, emanating from the general idea of human rights 
law. The question then was whether the Katyr-Yurt bombings were 
absolutely necessary in defense of persons, as Russia claimed, since in 
such a case, deprivation of life might be justified. The court’s analysis of 
the question followed a three-tiered approach reflecting, to some extent, 
jus ad bellum thinking.228 First, “absolutely necessary” consists, as per the 
court, of the need “to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse 
to lethal force,”229 and that force must be “strictly proportionate to the 
achievement of the permitted aims.”230 This reasoning mirrors traditional 
jus ad bellum considerations of necessity and proportionality.231 The 
second tier, albeit only implicitly referred to in Isayeva, holds that even 
when force can be generally justified, less harmful means must be 
considered prior to each attack, even when the targeted individual is 
 
 221. Gioia, supra note 218, at 222. IHRL application allows for this sidestep because the existence 
of an armed conflict is a precondition for IHL’s application, whereas that is not the case for IHRL. 
See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 101, art. 3. 
 222. 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 791 (2005). 
 223. Id. ¶¶ 3, 162. 
 224. Id. ¶ 170. 
 225. Id. ¶¶ 133, 191. 
 226. Gioia, supra note 218, at 204. 
 227. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 172. 
 228. See Abresch, supra note 207, at 764–65. 
 229. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 175. 
 230. Id. ¶ 173. 
 231. See, e.g., Dapo Akande & Thomas Liefländer, Clarifying Necessity, Imminence and 
Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 563, 564–68 (2013). 
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participating in combat.232 This view essentially breaks down the conduct 
of hostilities to a continuous series of ad bellum decisions; there is no 
formal “threshold” that once crossed allows the “wholesale” targeting 
usually associated with armed conflict under IHL. The third tier 
correlates with traditional jus in bello obligations to take precautionary 
measures, requiring that once recourse is made to lethal force, steps 
should be taken to minimize incidental harm to civilians.233 
The Isayeva court analyzed the first and second tiers in a laconic 
manner, which implies significant deference to state discretion. It ruled 
that the situation in Chechnya called for “exceptional measures,” in 
order to “regain control” over the state and “to suppress the illegal 
armed insurgency.”234 Given the circumstances, those measures could 
include “the deployment of army units” with heavy weaponry such as 
warplanes and artillery.235 At first glance, this seems like a sovereignty-
centered, collectivist view of internal resort to force. However, the court 
also noted the presence of many Chechen fighters in the village, and 
their active resistance to law enforcement, which implied the logic of self-
defense according to individualist standards.236 The court thus ruled that 
Russia might have been justified in resorting to force in the 
circumstances at hand.237 Nonetheless, the court’s analysis leaves much to 
be desired, as it made only a passing, one-paragraph reference to these 
complex issues, before moving on to analyze in greater detail the civilian 
harm caused by the specific bombing.238 
Thus, despite the ECtHR’s cautious steps toward limiting internal 
resorts to force, its jurisprudence does not fully resolve the issue.239 First, 
there is much that remains ambiguous about the inner workings of 
Article 2. In terms of just causes for internal force, the court did not 
clarify the relation between the collectivist and individualist 
understandings of the “absolutely necessary” standard, which it 
simultaneously offered when discussing Russia’s resort to force.240 More 
 
 232. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 172–75; see Abresch, supra note 207, at 758 (“Even with respect 
to persons taking active part in hostilities, the ECHR only permits the use of lethal force when capture 
is too risky.”). 
 233. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 175. 
 234. Id. ¶ 180. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. Likewise, the court held that the primary objective of the deployment of heavy weapons 
should be “to protect lives from unlawful violence.” Id. ¶ 191. 
 237. Id. ¶ 180. 
 238. Specifically, the court considered that no effective warning was given to civilians, that the 
weapons used were indiscriminate, and that safe passage for civilians escaping the village was not 
ensured. Id. ¶¶ 183–200. 
 239. See Abresch, supra note 207, at 765–67. 
 240. The court ruled that “a balance must be achieved between the aim pursued and the means 
employed to achieve it,” but it did not make clear whether the “aim pursued” to be assessed is on the 
macro (regaining control) or micro (unit self-defense) levels. Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 181. 
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generally, the court has yet to elaborate on the interaction between the 
“defense of persons” exception—explicitly relied upon by Russia in 
Isayeva—and the other exceptions under Article 2(2). While the 
“defense” exception conforms to the reductive approach, it is doubtful 
whether deprivation of life during arrest or quelling a riot or insurrection 
can be reconciled with the view that killing could only be justified in self-
or-other-defense. Additionally, the court’s reference in Isayeva to 
“illegal” insurgency as a justification for force raises the question of 
whether it was the specific Chechen uprising which was illegal, or rather 
any insurgency per se, and further, whether illegality is to be determined 
strictly in light of domestic law or also by reference to international 
norms. 
Second, it should be remembered that human rights jurisprudence 
mainly concerns state action. Although it is obvious that the right to life 
must apply in some form between private individuals, existing case law 
does not tell us much about the limitations on resort to force by nonstate 
actors.241 
Third, and most importantly, it must be recalled that in all relevant 
ECtHR cases, the impugned states themselves refrained from claiming 
that an internal armed conflict existed within their territories; they did 
not file a “civil war” derogation under Article 15. Thus, it is debatable 
whether the cautious regulation of resort to force described above would 
survive if states choose to act otherwise.242 Recent ECtHR jurisprudence 
gives cause for pessimism in this context. In 2014’s landmark Hassan v. 
United Kingdom, the court was called to rule on the relation between the 
right to liberty entrenched in Article 5 of the ECHR and the rules 
regulating detention under IHL.243 The case’s special importance was that 
for the first time, the State asked the court to disregard Article 5 in favor 
of relevant IHL provisions, or alternatively, to interpret the Article as 
accommodating the detention powers provided for in the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions.244 Although Article 5’s language is 
exhaustive, the court interpreted it as allowing the more expansive 
detention powers available under IHL, even absent derogation by the 
State to that effect.245 Importantly, the court emphasized that such an 
 
 241. See Abresch, supra note 207, at 753. 
 242. See Gioia, supra note 218, at 224 (“In situations where Article 15 ECHR is invoked, there can be 
no doubt that IHL may be applied in order to determine what constitutes a ‘lawful act of war.’”). Even 
absent derogations, some understood the court’s “necessary in a democratic society” limitation as 
correlating with the IHL concept of “military necessity” rather than jus ad bellum necessity. See Abresch, 
supra note 207, at 766; see also Aisling Reidy, The Approach of the European Commission and Court of 
Human Rights to International Humanitarian Law, 80 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 519 (1998). 
 243. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014). 
 244. Id. ¶ 99. 
 245. Id. ¶ 104. 
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interpretation is only possible when the State appeals to IHL to justify its 
actions.246 
Granted, the court stressed that the ruling was limited to 
international armed conflicts—where rules of detention are relatively 
clear.247 In internal armed conflicts, presumably, the state would at least 
be required to lodge a formal derogation in order to justify forms of 
detention not envisioned by Article 5. Nonetheless, considering the 
power that the court attributed to the existence of an armed conflict in 
shaping its interpretation, we can definitely envision a situation in which 
for the first time, a state would invoke IHL in an internal conflict—or 
lodge a derogation—and thus bypass even the modest steps the court has 
made in Isayeva in favor of limiting internal resorts to force. 
The implication of the above is that under positive IHRL, the 
existence of an internal armed conflict could be used as a proxy for the 
lawfulness of resorting to force. This is because the factual existence of 
an armed conflict is commonly understood to effect a switch between the 
spheres of “peace” and “war,” which in turn ushers in a normative 
change. However, under this understanding, IHRL does not regulate the 
terms of the paradigm switch itself: it merely recognizes it.248 In a sense, 
when these dynamics occur, normative issues of jus ad bellum collapse 
into factual questions of jus in bello; and jus in bello, in turn, undermines 
the possibility of an IHRL-based regulation of internal jus ad bellum. 
The next subpart elaborates on this problematic outcome. 
B. The Collapse into the “Armed Conflict” Discourse  
1. The Emergence of the “Armed Conflict” Discourse as a Proxy for 
Jus ad Bellum in Noninternational Armed Conflicts 
Following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
ensuing U.S.-led “global war on terror,” the legal regulation of the use of 
force between states and nonstate actors became a dominant issue in 
international discourse. At first, the key question was whether states 
enjoyed the right, under jus ad bellum, to exercise transnational self-
defense against nonstate actors.249 While some controversy still remains,250 
 
 246. Id. ¶ 107. 
 247. Id. ¶ 104; see also Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, The Grand Chamber Judgment in Hassan v. UK, 
EJIL Talk! (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-grand-chamber-judgment-in-hassan-v-uk/. 
 248. See, e.g., Abresch, supra note 207, at 745 n.11 (citing G.I.A.D. Draper, Human Rights and the 
Law of War, 12 Va. J. Int’l L. 326, 338 (1972) (arguing that war is an “exceptional situation” resulting 
in derogation from the human rights system)). 
 249. For an outline of state practice regarding this question before 9/11, see Ruys, supra note 134, 
at 42133; see also Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense, Article 
51(1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 Fletcher Forum World Aff. 35 (2003) 
(discussing the impact of the events of September 11th on the right to self-defense). 
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state practice and most mainstream writers now accept that in some 
cases, cross-border forcible action against nonstate actors can be justified 
under the right to self-defense.251 
However, as the “war on terror” lingered, it became increasingly 
difficult to trace this or that forcible action to any previous or imminent 
armed attack, and to define the geographical boundaries of this so-called 
“war.”252 The main question became whether the law of armed conflict 
applied at all in the various arenas where the United States operated. 
Two conflicting interest groups answered this question in the negative. 
The Bush administration argued that transnational conflicts—being 
neither international nor internal—are not subject to the constraints of 
the law of armed conflict to begin with.253 It suffices to point out, for our 
purposes, that the U.S. Supreme Court soon discarded this approach.254 
Nonetheless, many in the international human rights community also 
argued that IHL did not apply to the war on terror—but from an entirely 
different angle: it did not apply because the various struggles comprising 
it did not amount to an armed conflict.255 
The focus of the international human rights community on the 
existence of an armed conflict for the purpose of drawing normative 
conclusions—a tendency that I call the “armed conflict” discourse—
reflects a significant shift in the general role of IHL within the 
international legal system. Shortly put, the shift is between viewing IHL 
as a constraining normative system (in relation to a generally enabling, 
 
 250. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion]. But see id. 
Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins ¶ 33; Declaration of Judge Buergenthal ¶ 6; Sean D. Murphy, Self-
Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the I.C.J.? 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 62 
(2005); see also Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me—“In Defense of the International 
Court,” 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 76 (2005). 
 251. S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); see also Ruys, supra note 134, 
at 443–510; Daniel Betlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against 
an Imminent or Actual Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (2012); Kress, supra note 11, at 
43–51. At least one commentator raised the possibility that the right to self-defense against nonstate 
actors is mirrored by a prohibition on the use of force by such actors. See Nicholas Tsagourias, Non-
State Actors in International Peace and Security: Non-State Actors and the Use of Force, in 
Participants in the International Legal System 326, 326–33 (Jean d’Aspremont ed., 2011). Others 
have argued for such a prohibition, but only on targeting of civilians. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & 
William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1, 2 (2002). 
 252. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of 
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. Penn. L. Rev. 675, 677–80 (2004). 
 253. Id. at 682. 
 254. In the Hamdan case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the struggle between the United 
States and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was a noninternational armed conflict, subject to the provisions 
of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631–32 (2006). 
 255. See Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), 
Study on Targeted Killings, ¶¶ 53–56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010); see also 
Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 252, at 679–80; Luban, supra note 125, at 29. 
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Lotus-based freedom to act)256 and its perception as an enabling system 
(in relation to the constraining background of IHRL). Since this point is 
paramount to understanding how IHL undermines internal jus ad 
bellum, it is worthwhile to elaborate on this process further. 
Indeed, the distinction between civil unrest, regarding which the 
laws of war do not apply, and civil wars—in which these laws kick in—is 
as old as IHL itself.257 However, in the past, this distinction mainly served 
to entrench state sovereignty. The default rule was that domestic strife, 
as an issue between the state and its subjects, was beyond the reach of 
international law altogether.258 Only when the opposition exhibited state-
like qualities—namely, by conducting organized hostilities and exercising 
effective control over territory—could sovereignty be compromised by 
subjecting an otherwise internal situation to international law.259 This was 
the backdrop for the factual criteria for the existence of noninternational 
armed conflicts, adopted later in Protocol II,260 and by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.261 Since the alternative was freedom of 
action, states were incentivized not to recognize that an armed conflict 
existed, while rebels were motivated to do exactly the opposite.262 
Nowadays, however, when an armed conflict does not exist, 
international law is not mute. Rather, the more restrictive normative 
framework of IHRL applies alone. Under IHRL, institutional violence is 
restricted to the “law enforcement” paradigm, which severely restricts 
deprivation of life to situations where an imminent threat is 
determined.263 Conversely, during armed conflict the more permissive 
paradigm of “hostilities,” regulated by IHL, steps to the fore.264 
 
 256. The famous Lotus principle holds that in general, states are free to act in absence of an 
express constraining norm. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 ¶ 44 (Sept. 7). 
 257. See supra note 81. 
 258. See supra Part I.B. 
 259. See supra note 81. 
 260. Protocol II, supra note 20, art. 1. 
 261. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 262. See Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict 200–04 
(2012). As Baxter stated in 1974 “the first line of defense against international humanitarian law, is to 
deny that it applies at all.” Richard Baxter, Some Existing Problems in Humanitarian Law, in The 
Concept of International Armed Conflict: Further Outlook 1, 2 (Proceedings of the International 
Symposium on Humanitarian Law, 1974), reprinted in Commemoration of the Centenary of the 
Brussels Declaration of 1874 on the Laws and Customs of War, 14 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 271 (1971). 
This explains, for instance, the reluctance by the Union, during the American Civil War to recognize 
that the conflict was a “war” in the legal sense, while the Confederacy claimed full belligerent rights. 
See Neff, supra note 165, at 7, 15–16. This also explains why the belligerency doctrine has generally 
fallen into desuetude. See Lieblich, supra note 67, at 82–83, 122. 
 263. Basic Principles, supra note 21, art. 9. 
 264. I set aside the general question of the relation between IHRL and IHL during hostilities. See 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 ¶¶ 24–25 (July 
8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion]; Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 250, ¶¶ 102, 
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Combatants and other unprotected persons can be lethally targeted, and 
collateral damage to uninvolved civilians is tolerated in circumstances 
much wider than the conventional understanding of IHRL allows.265 The 
factual existence of armed conflict was thus phrased as a precondition for 
the switch between the ordinary human rights law of peacetime and the 
“state of exception” of the laws of war.266 IHL, then, becomes a defense: 
as stated bluntly by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—
“humanitarian law may be a defense available to a State to rebut charged 
violations of human rights during internal hostilities.”267 As the 
international human rights regime becomes stronger, the traditional 
incentive system will be reversed. Under these circumstances, it becomes 
clear that to enhance their freedom of action, states have at least some 
incentive to classify a situation as an armed conflict, while nonstate 
actors might argue the opposite.268 
Arguably, the roots of this reversal of incentives can be traced to the 
ICJ’s 1994 Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.269 There, among many 
other questions, the court considered the relations between IHL and 
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, which prohibits, as discussed above, the 
 
105 (Jul. 9, 2004). For a discussion and critique see Marko Milanović, Norm Conflicts, International 
Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights Law, in Pas de Deux, supra note 218, at 95–125. 
 265. Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 252, at 676, 692; Luban, supra note 125, at 29; see also Lieblich, 
supra note 15, at 364–72 (detailing the differences between the law enforcement and hostilities 
paradigms); Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the 
“Fog of Law”, 13 Y.B. Int’l Hum. L. 311, 319 (2010); see, e.g., Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin R. Farley, 
Characterizing U.S. Operations in Pakistan: Is the U.S. Engaged in an Armed Conflict, 34 Fordham 
Int’l L.J. 151 (2011); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of 
Pakistan, 2004-2009, in Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force 
263, 290–91 (Simon Bronitt ed., 2012) (arguing that targeted killings by the United States in Pakistan 
were unlawful, inter alia, since there was no armed conflict); Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is War Not 
a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 535 (2006); International 
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global Justice 
Clinic (NYU School of Law), Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians 
from US Drone Practices in Pakistan 110–118 (2012); see also Nils Melzer, Targeted Killing in 
International Law 224, 243–47 (2008). 
 266. See Jens David Ohlin, The Crime of Bootstrapping, in The Crime of Aggression: A 
Commentary (Claus Kress & Stefan Barriga eds., forthcoming) (on file with author).  
 267. Avilán v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 168 (1998). As Ohlin argues, therefore, once IHL kicks in, critics of 
armed violence “have largely lost the legal debate” and that the choice of legal framework is usually 
“outcome determinative.” Ohlin, supra note 19, at 2 (making this claim in the context of targeted 
killings). 
 268. See David Kretzmer, Rethinking the Application of IHL in Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, 42 Isr. L. Rev. 8, 39 (2009) (noting that given the development of IHRL, categorization of a 
situation as an armed conflict may grant states more leeway). When considering this incentive system, 
it is also noteworthy that once “war” exists, executives also enjoy significant leeway according to some 
domestic systems. In the American context, see for example, Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the End of 
War, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 143, 143–50 (2014). 
 269. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 264. 
Lieblich-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:20 PM 
April 2016] INTERNAL JUS AD BELLUM 733 
arbitrary deprivation of life.270 The court famously set forth a lex specialis 
test, holding that during armed conflict, the term “arbitrary” is 
determined by reference to what is lawful under IHL.271 When this 
reasoning is applied in the internal sphere, however—absent another rule 
of internal jus ad bellum—the existence of an armed conflict becomes 
also a measure for the decision to resort to armed force. For all practical 
purposes, jus in bello becomes a proxy for questions of jus ad bellum. 
Indeed, although most of the “armed conflict” discourse took place 
in the context of transnational forcible actions conducted by the United 
States, it quickly became interwoven with the question of internal 
forcible action. This is because once a territorial government was 
involved in an armed conflict against opposition groups, it could, in 
general, consent to forcible intervention by third parties.272 Thus, for 
instance, even if there was no direct, armed conflict between the United 
States and militants in other states, consensual forcible actions by the 
former could still be justified if there was an armed conflict inside the 
target state.273 Under this paradigm, external jus ad bellum, too, becomes 
subordinated to a jus in bello determination on the internal level. 
The famous Abella v. Argentina case,274 decided by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”), is a clear 
example for the obfuscation of ad bellum and in bello considerations in 
internal settings.275 In 1989, forty-two armed individuals stormed an 
Argentinian infantry base, La Tablada. Fighting lasted thirty hours and 
resulted in over thirty casualties, as Argentinian forces took back the 
base by military force.276 The petitioners, among them relatives of the 
attackers who lost their lives, challenged the lawfulness of the forcible 
response by the State.277 Interestingly, one of the petitioners’ main 
arguments strongly corresponded with a jus ad bellum argument: a coup 
d’etat was planned in La Tablada, and in such case, the Argentinian 
Constitution authorized citizens to take up arms, while the State’s 
forcible response was unlawful.278 The forcible response by the State was 
“unnecessary” and “disproportionate,” as the government should have 
 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. ¶ 25. 
 272. Lieblich, supra note 67, at 3. 
 273. Id. at 157–58. 
 274. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998). 
 275. The Inter-American Human Rights System, in general, was more willing to apply or interpret 
IHL norms than other systems. For a useful analysis, see Tabak, supra note 220. 
 276. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97 ¶ 1. 
 277. They also claimed that after the fighting, captured attackers were executed, tortured, or 
disappeared, in violation of their right to life and due process guarantees. Id. ¶¶ 3–6. See Tabak, supra 
note 220, at 234–37. 
 278. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97 ¶¶ 1–2, 7, 172. 
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addressed the situation by law enforcement measures and not by 
hostilities.279 
As common in the “armed conflict” discourse, the Commission first 
determined whether an armed conflict existed in order to determine 
whether IHL kicks in or whether IHRL applies alone.280 It quickly 
concluded that the incident at La Tablada amounted to an armed 
conflict, despite its brief duration281: 
What differentiates the events at the La Tablada base from these 
situations [internal disturbances] are the concerted nature of the 
hostile acts undertaken by the attackers, the direct involvement of 
governmental armed forces, and the nature and level of the violence 
attending the events in question. More particularly, the attackers . . . 
executed an armed attack, i.e., a military operation, against a 
quintessential military objective—a military base. The officer in charge 
of the La Tablada base sought, as was his duty, to repulse the attackers, 
and President Alfonsín, exercising his constitutional authority . . . 
ordered that military action be taken to recapture the base and subdue 
the attackers.282 
In its determination of the existence of an armed conflict, the 
Commission, besides applying standard IHL tests of intensity, adopted 
language that implied a jus ad bellum discourse: the petitioners conducted 
an “armed attack,” and the government sought to repel it, perhaps in self-
defense.283 One cannot but notice the Commission’s approval of such action, 
by its emphasis on the duty to “repulse” the attackers. The petitioners 
conversely, “clearly assumed the risk of a military response.”284 Arguably, 
jus ad bellum considerations informed the Commission’s decision that, in 
fact, an armed conflict existed—but since internal jus ad bellum remains a 
blank spot in positive law, this reasoning is concealed in jus in bello 
discourse. 
This concealment allowed the Commission, when moving to apply 
the law, to summarily reject the petitioners’ internal jus ad bellum claims 
on the basis that once an armed conflict exists, IHL steps in, and as such, 
it is blind to “the legitimacy of the reasons or the cause” for which arms 
 
 279. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. 
 280. Id. ¶¶ 147, 151. 
 281. Id. ¶ 156. 
 282. Id. ¶ 155 (emphasis added). 
 283. Id. The Commission has followed a similar route in the Avilán case. See Avilán v. Colombia, 
Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 26/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 133 (1998) 
(holding that since an internal armed conflict exists in Colombia, “the Colombian State has the full 
right to defend itself from violent actions that may be taken against it, and to take military actions 
against . . . irregular armed groups”). 
 284. Abella, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97 ¶ 179. 
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were taken up.285 It thereafter proceeded to assess the state’s conduct in 
light of IHL, finding, in general, no fault.286 
Indeed, this reasoning could seem like an elegant solution. After all, 
its underlying logic is compelling: armed hostilities are undertaken where 
a state, in fact, cannot resort to its regular justice system to confront the 
challenge and establish order. Already in the seventeenth century, 
Edward Coke observed that the interruption of “the peaceable course of 
justice” was precisely the watershed between internal peace and war.287 
However, relying on factual jus in bello determinations as a proxy for jus 
ad bellum muddles the discourse. On its own, jus in bello is ill-equipped 
to address questions of this order both in its structure and theoretical 
underpinnings; most notably, it pays no mind to the ethical standards for 
killing, explored earlier on. Because of the centrality of the “armed 
conflict” discourse in international legal argument, it is worthwhile to 
explore these problems in some detail. 
2. The Circularity of the “Armed Conflict” Discourse 
The first problem of the “armed conflict” discourse is its circularity: 
the existence of an armed conflict is determined through thresholds 
established by IHL itself, without explicit reference to an external 
Archimedean point. Now, because these thresholds are strictly factual, 
IHL’s normative potential to supplant questions of jus ad bellum is 
severely limited.288 At most, they can only identify, but not regulate, the 
switch between the legal paradigms of law enforcement and hostilities. In 
a sense, using IHL as a proxy for jus ad bellum is a legal exception that 
establishes itself without regard to the general rule or the values it is 
purposed to ensure. Deducing a right to resort to force from an existence 
of an armed conflict, simply put, confuses “is” with “ought,” fact and 
norm.289 Indeed, this situation brings about an awkward, circular result: a 
state is justified to resort to hostilities when hostilities exist. This, of 
course, enhances the risk of abuse. States could unilaterally raise the 
intensity of internal unrest, and then proceed to invoke the fact that an 
armed conflict exists in order to justify the hostilities, thus bypassing 
 
 285. Id. ¶ 173. The Commission has also ruled that the motives of the petitioners, as individuals, 
are issues of domestic law. Id. ¶ 175. 
 286. Id. ¶¶ 176–89. It should be added that the Commission’s competence to directly apply IHL 
was heavily criticized in later rulings, and might not reflect the lex lata in the Inter-American system. 
Tabak, supra note 220, at 230–32. 
 287. Neff, supra note 165, at 40. 
 288. See Abresch, supra note 207, at 765 (“[H]umanitarian law is agnostic regarding the legality of 
the aims [of the resort to force] themselves.”). 
 289. See, e.g., Stanley L. Paulson, Hans Kelsen’s Earliest Legal Theory, in Norms and Normativity: 
Critical Reflections on Kelsenian Themes 23, 29 (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski 
Paulson eds., 1998). 
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their human rights commitments.290 Under such an incentive system, 
states can manipulate their way into an armed conflict through acts on 
the ground, thus gaining the de facto right to conduct hostilities while 
bearing no material legal costs.291 
The problem of circularity reaches further. As aforementioned, it 
spawns consequences for external jus ad bellum, since when an internal 
armed conflict exists within a state, it can generally consent to third-party 
forcible intervention.292 This is the case, for instance, in the recent action 
by the United States against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(“ISIL”) in Iraq, conducted upon the request of the Iraqi Government,293 
as well as the ongoing campaign in Yemen against Houthi rebels, in 
which Arab states explicitly invoked the consent of Yemen’s embattled 
president.294 Now, although intervening states might provide additional 
justifications for such actions—for instance, invoking an ambiguous claim 
of self-defense295—in legal terms, governmental consent can often act as a 
standalone justification for transnational use of force, at least as long as 
the requesting government is recognized. If the existence of an armed 
conflict is enough to justify internal uses of force, and consequentially 
also external involvement, external parties do not need to substantively 
justify their intervention beyond the governmental consent they have 
received.296 The potential of external forcible support, in turn, generates 
further incentives for governments to abuse the armed conflict discourse. 
3. The Normative Limitations of Jus in Bello as a Proxy for Jus ad 
Bellum 
Circularity is not the only shortcoming of the “armed conflict” 
discourse. Another is IHL’s limitations as a normative system, which 
 
 290. Alston, supra note 255, ¶¶ 47–48; see also Lieblich, supra note 67, at 50 (pointing out such 
possible dynamics in the early stages of the Syrian crisis). 
 291. Indeed, nowadays, being recognized as a party to an internal armed conflict—beyond in 
narrow circumstances—does not result in any material advantage to opposition groups, but only to 
states. Members of armed groups can be targeted under the hostilities paradigm, but have no right to 
participate in hostilities and can thus be prosecuted in accordance with domestic law. See, e.g., Nils 
Melzer, Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 84 (2009). 
 292. See supra note 268. 
 293. U.S. Military Conducts Airstrikes in Support of Dam Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Sept. 7, 
2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123103. 
 294. Saudi and Arab Allies Bomb Houthi Positions in Yemen, AlJazeera (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/03/saudi-ambassador-announces-military-operation- 
yemen-150325234138956.html. 
 295. See, e.g., U.S. Military Conducts Airstrikes in Support of Dam Operations, supra note 293 
(arguing that the strikes were conducted also “to protect U.S. personnel and facilities”). On the 
relations between self-defense and consent as jus ad bellum justifications, see Lieblich, supra note 67, 
at 14–18. 
 296. For a critique of this result and a suggestion for reform, see Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the 
Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, 54 Harv. J. Int’l L.J. 1 (2013). 
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emanates from its relatively modest aspirations. Indeed, since they deal 
with killing, both jus ad bellum and jus in bello are nonideal theories—
meaning, they aim to minimize the evil of a given problematic 
situation.297 However, a key difference between them remains. Assuming 
full compliance, jus ad bellum achieves a morally ideal situation in which 
resort to war is eliminated. Conversely, jus in bello—even if universally 
followed to the letter—still remains the lesser evil, since it only aims to 
regulate wars and mitigate their harm, rather than to prevent them.298 If 
the international law on the use of force sets out to “save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war,”299 IHL does not attempt to do so. 
Rather, it seeks to alleviate “as much as possible the calamities of war.”300 
Indeed, under jus in bello, it is possible to envision an atrocious war 
in terms of harm to combatants and civilians, which would nevertheless 
be perfectly legal if the principles of distinction and proportionality are 
followed.301 Following the work of David Kennedy, Gabriella Blum 
dubbed these dynamics as the “numbing effects” of IHL.302 Once entering 
the realm of IHL, the discussion takes violence as a given and reverts to a 
seemingly technical discussion: Which rules govern detention?303 What 
constitutes effective warning?304 What are the limits of lawful collateral 
damage?305 However, questions relating to the necessity or proportionality 
of the resort to force itself do not even surface.306 Indeed, these dynamics 
can occur also in international conflicts—in which jus ad bellum is part of 
positive law. This might be due to the heavily politicized nature of jus ad 
 
 297. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 7–8 (6th ed. 2003). 
 298. See Marco Sassòli et al., How Does Law Protect in War? chs. 1–2 (3d ed. 2011); Luban, 
supra note 125, at 2. 
 299. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 300. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight, Saint Petersburg, 29 November/11 December 1868 pmbl. [hereinafter St. 
Petersburg Declaration] (emphasis added). 
 301. This is because IHL traditionally holds that combatants can always be targeted (unless they 
are hors de combat), while civilians and civilian objects can only be harmed as proportional “collateral 
damage.” See Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in 
War 251, 272–80 (2010); see also Dill, supra note 127, at 262 (“[IHL] cannot guarantee a moral 
standard in the outcome of the confrontation or even prejudge that outcome . . . [it] leaves the moral 
question about war unanswered.”). 
 302. See Blum, supra note 18, at 74 n.6. 
 303. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Editorial Comment: The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 
103 Am. J. Int’l L. 48 (2009). For a recent case, see Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for 
Defence [2015] EWCA (Civ) 843 ¶¶ 164–251 (Eng.). 
 304. Pnina Sharvit Baruch & Noam Neuman, Warning Civilians Prior to Attack Under 
International Law: Theory and Practice, 87 Int’l Legal Stud. 359 (2011). 
 305. Ziv Bohrer & Mark Osiel, Proportionality in Military Force at War’s Multiple Levels: Averting 
Civilian Casualties vs. Safeguarding Soldiers, 46 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 747 (2013). 
 306. See Chase Madar, Short Cuts, 37 London Rev. Books 16 (2015) (arguing that “jus in bello has 
swallowed jus ad bellum whole”). 
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bellum307 and the famous “flight from politics” prevalent in international 
legal discourse.308 However, international law at least provides the 
language to discuss such issues on the interstate level, while evading 
them entirely internally. 
It is important to understand, in this context, the difference between 
necessity and proportionality in the jus ad bellum and jus in bello levels, 
as these differences highlight the weakness of using the latter as a proxy 
for the former. Traditionally, necessity under jus ad bellum pertains 
chiefly to considerations of last resort and immediacy; namely, it asks 
whether peaceful means to resolve the conflict are reasonably available.309 
Necessity under jus in bello, conversely, accepts force as a given and only 
aims to ensure that it is used for legitimate ends of warfare, meaning, 
weakening the military forces of the enemy.310 As such, it is generally 
oblivious to the killing of combatants. Proportionality, under jus ad 
bellum, scrutinizes the amount of force employed when countering the 
armed attack.311 Jus in bello proportionality, on the other hand, is 
oblivious to the scope of military operations on the whole and focuses on 
the incidental harm to civilians caused by a specific attack.312 Owing to 
these material differences, it is hard to see how in bello can effectively 
substitute ad bellum on the internal level. Of course, one method to 
bypass these limitations is by interpreting IHL in such a constraining 
manner, which if followed, would severely restrict military operations to 
begin with, thus achieving effects similar to a prohibition on the use of 
force.313 But this route has its own significant costs. As Michael Walzer 
notes, such constraints taken to the extreme essentially introduce pacifist 
considerations into the conduct of armed forces—a clear contradiction in 
terms.314 If IHL becomes perceived by belligerents in such a manner, 
there is significant danger that it will be discredited altogether.315 
 
 307. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum 
and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 47, 102 (2009). For instance, as 
is well known, the U.N. Security Council found that an international use of force amounted to an 
aggression only in rare instances. See, e.g., Carrie McDougall, The Crime of Aggression Under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 83–87 (2013). Interestingly, it has also been the 
policy of leading human rights NGOs to refrain from dealing with jus ad bellum. See Madar, supra 
note 306, at 16. 
 308. Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 4–7 (1990). 
 309. See, e.g., Ruys, supra note 134, at 95. 
 310. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 300 (“[T]he only legitimate object which States should 
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”). 
 311. Ruys, supra note 134, at 110 (“[I]n terms if the jus ad bellum, it is the forceful response as a 
whole that must be scrutinized.”). 
 312. Protocol I, supra note 147, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(ii). 
 313. See, e.g., Aerial Drone Deployment on 4 October 2010 in Mir Ali/Pakistan, Decision to 
Terminate Proceedings, 157 I.L.R. 722, 745 (2013) (Ger.) (claiming that “the underlying spirit” of IHL 
includes imposing “maximum possible constraints on war per se”). 
 314. Michael Walzer. Arguing About War 13–14 (2004); Michael Walzer, Coda: Can the Good 
Guys Win? 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 433, 439 (2013) (arguing that a restrictive view of in bello 
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4. Equal Application, the Absence of Fault, and Accountability Gap 
Last, the “armed conflict” discourse effectively silences any 
meaningful legal discussion on the fault and accountability of leaders and 
senior commanders concerning the resort to force. First, assuming that 
parties adhere to IHL during the conflict, then according to positive law, 
any discussion of responsibility is quashed, owing to the basic principle of 
equal application of IHL: in order to minimize war’s inherent inhumanity 
and for the practical need to prevent a race to the bottom,316 IHL 
(generally) applies equally to all parties, whether “just” or “unjust.”317 
Thus, absent a true doctrine of internal jus ad bellum, once an armed 
conflict exists, parties can proceed with the killing, and as long as they do 
not violate the laws of war, nobody can be held accountable on the 
international level for instigating the conflict, either on the level of state 
responsibility or on that of criminal liability. This results in a glaring gap 
in the protection of the right to life of both soldiers and armed 
opposition members, as well as civilians that can be incidentally harmed: 
their lives are simply not a matter for international law to consider. In 
interstate conflict, conversely, there is at least the conceptual possibility 
of state responsibility—through the prohibition on the use of force318—
and, in the long run, also of criminal accountability, through the 
international crime of aggression.319 Only a theoretical understanding of 
internal jus ad bellum could fill this gap on the internal level. 
Even when violations of IHL do take place, relying on jus in bello 
alone results in an accountability gap in relation to political leaders of 
states as well as of armed groups. As most jus in bello decisions are taken 
on an operational level, keeping the analysis on this level “kicks-down” 
the level of accountability. This is true not only regarding reputation 
costs—leaders and senior commanders can always deny involvement in 
war crimes committed by armed forces and thus distance themselves 
from atrocities—but also concerning the possibility of criminal liability. 
This is especially so when considering the recent weakening of doctrines 
 
proportionality “sometimes serves as the functional equivalent of pacifism”); see also Luban, supra 
note 125, at 29–31 (criticizing the “overextension” of human rights thinking which amount to the 
denial of armed conflicts’ salient characteristics). 
 315. See Walzer, supra note 314, at 433–34, 439 (noting military lawyers often argue that the 
“credibility” of IHL is crucial for its application). See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: 
Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 641, at 690–91 (2010). 
 316. See, e.g., Walzer, supra note 314, at 439. 
 317. Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52 Harv. Int’l L.J. 163, 168 (2011). The 
principle of equal application has been heavily criticized, on the moral level, by revisionist theorists. 
See McMahan, supra note 116, at 1–19. However, even they concede that as a matter of pragmatics 
and positive law the principle is currently indispensable. Id. at 104–10. 
 318. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 319. Assuming the Rome Statue’s definition of the crime of aggression enters into force. For an 
overview, see McDougall, supra note 307, at 1–31. 
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such as “joint criminal enterprise” and aiding and abetting (the “specific 
direction” requirement) in some of the recent rulings of the International 
Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).320 
In sum, as demonstrated in this Part, while IHRL provides a 
possible conceptual framework for an ethically defendable doctrine of 
internal jus ad bellum, there is a constant threat of collapse into the 
“armed conflict” discourse. The latter, unfortunately, cannot serve as an 
effective proxy. It is clear thus that more work must be done in order to 
augment IHRL as a relevant regime for the prohibition and regulation of 
internal force. 
V.  Toward a Working Doctrine of Internal JUS AD BELLUM 
So far, this Article has outlined the general ethical framework for a 
theory of internal jus ad bellum, equally applicable to states and 
opposition, based on the idea that resort to hostilities can only be permitted 
in self-defense. Moving to international law, I then demonstrated that 
collectivist doctrines do not satisfy this framework and also raise a host 
of other problems. Moving to the individualist discourse of IHRL, I 
pointed out its potential to regulate the resort to internal hostilities 
through its defense of the right to life, but also noted why contemporary 
doctrine and jurisprudence raise concerns as to its effectiveness in this 
context. Finally, I addressed the problematic dynamics between IHRL and 
IHL that further undermine IHRL’s potency to fulfill this role. In this 
final Part, I explore what would be needed in order for IHRL to do so. 
Of course, these suggestions are by no means exhaustive, rather they 
serve as a departure point for further discussion and development. 
A. The Right to Life as a Prohibition on the First Resort to 
Hostilities 
First, for IHRL to serve as a functional doctrine of internal jus ad 
bellum, it should be clarified that resort to internal hostilities can only be 
undertaken in self-or-other-defense against a prior use of force amounting 
to hostilities. In terms of legal technique, this poses no special challenges. 
Article 6(1) of the ICCPR can easily serve as a baseline for the 
prohibition on the resort to internal hostilities, as it protects every human 
being, including soldiers, members of opposition groups, as well as 
 
 320. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 89–98 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012) (regarding joint criminal enterprise); Prosecutor v. Perisić, Case 
No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 25–36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) 
(requiring “specific direction” in aiding and abetting crimes). But see Prosecutor v. Sainović, Case No. 
IT-05-87-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 1649–50 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014) (ruling 
the opposite). For an analysis of these decisions, see Marko Milanović, The Self-Fragmentation of the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber, EJIL: Talk! (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-self-fragmentation-
of-the-icty-appeals-chamber/. 
Lieblich-67.3.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2016 10:20 PM 
April 2016] INTERNAL JUS AD BELLUM 741 
uninvolved persons that might suffer the consequences of any armed 
conflict, even if conducted lawfully under IHL. Considering the object 
and purpose of the ICCPR,321 there is no reason to analyze the exception 
to the right to life manifested in the “arbitrarily” caveat, by reference 
only to the norms of IHL during active hostilities and not to the decision 
to resort to hostilities itself. If the right to life is understood this way, we 
can phrase the following normative conclusion: If a decision is made to 
resort to hostilities in absence of a threat to life or limb comparable in its 
scale and effects to that emanating from armed hostilities, then the 
ensuing killings could be considered as arbitrary deprivations of life—
even if they do not violate IHL per se.322 
The situation is more complicated when considering IHRL treaties 
such as the ECHR, which permit the deprivation of life in specific 
circumstances. Nonetheless, a similar understanding is not beyond 
conventional legal reasoning. Article 2(1) of the ECHR, which entrenches 
the right to life, can be viewed as establishing the prohibition on the resort 
to internal hostilities, while Article 2(2) provides exceptions. Article 
2(2)(a) refers to the “defence of any person from unlawful violence,” 
which fits neatly with the idea that resort to hostilities can be conducted 
only in self-or-other-defense. The term “unlawful” provides enough 
interpretational leeway to argue that first resort to hostilities, by any 
person or entity is prohibited, and that only such cases give rise to the 
right to act in self-defense. The main challenge, however, is posed by the 
exceptions outlined in Articles 2(2)(c) and the derogations regime 
enshrined in Article 15(2). Article 2(2)(c) refers to the “action lawfully 
taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”323 As discussed 
earlier, the ECtHR glossed over the question of whether a state is 
effectively entitled to resort to hostilities to quash every insurrection, 
even if instigated by acts of the state itself.324 Nonetheless, the term 
“lawfully” can play a key role here also, if interpreted in its context, and 
in light of the provisions of said Article 2(2)(a), which require that 
deprivation of life be a result of self-or-other-defense.325 Thus, the 
“insurrection” exclusion can be reasonably understood as excluding 
decisions to resort to hostilities in order to quell an insurrection, only if 
the resort to force is a defensive action. In the same vein, Article 15(2), 
which addresses derogations from the right to life in times of war, refers 
to the “lawful” acts of war. Again, there is no reason to restrict the 
 
 321. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, ¶ 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 322. Cf. Basic Principles, supra note 21, art. 9. 
 323. ECHR, supra note 176, art. 2, ¶ 2(c). 
 324. See supra p. 730. 
 325. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 321, art. 31 ¶¶ 1–2. The same 
reasoning can apply to the interpretation of Article 2, ¶ 2(b) of the ECHR, supra note 176, which 
permits deprivation of life when attempting to effect a “lawful” arrest. 
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understanding of the term to lawful in bello actions, as it can be plausibly 
constructed to refer also to the decision to resort to hostilities itself. 
B. Necessity, Proportionality, and the Meaning of Thresholds 
Furthermore, the exceptions to right to life are limited by necessity 
and proportionality limitations, which mirror, to a large extent, the same 
limitations applying in external jus ad bellum. The term “arbitrarily,” 
enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, has been understood as implying 
a “last resort” requirement—essentially, a necessity condition—as well as 
means-end and less-extreme-measures proportionality standards.326 
Similarly, as discussed above, Article 2(2) of the ECHR restricts the 
exceptions to the right to life to “use of force which is no more than 
absolutely necessary,” which implies the same standards.327 
Applied to the issue at hand, the key question is under which 
circumstances can resort to massive armed violence in the form of 
hostilities be viewed as a necessary and proportionate action for the 
purpose of self-or-other-defense. The answer must be that these 
circumstances can only include situations in which the threat to self or 
others emanates from actions amounting to hostilities themselves. 
Possibly, a viable rule of thumb, already existing in international law, is 
that the scale and effects of such actions must at least mirror that of an 
“armed attack”—whether against civilians or armed forces—on the 
international level.328 A recent example could be the July 2015 highly 
sophisticated assault by ISIL-linked militants against the Egyptian army 
in north Sinai.329 In other cases, either law enforcement measures, or—
from the point of view of opposition—nonviolent resistance can suffice.330 
 
 326. See Basic Principles, supra note 21, arts. 3–4, 9. For an elaboration on necessity and 
proportionality in the context of the use of force under the right to life, see Philip Alston (Special 
Rapporteur), Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶¶ 33–45, U.N. Doc. A/61/311 (Sept. 5, 
2006). 
 327. ECHR, supra note 176, art. 2, ¶ 2. 
 328. For the scale and effect test in relation to actions by nonstate actors, see Military Aid and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 
27); see also Stahn, supra note 249, at 45–46. Of course, massive “peacetime” violence against civilians 
in the form of genocide or crimes against humanity would fulfill the scale and effects test. 
 329. Ashraf Sweilam & Brian Rohan, Scores Killed as Militants Attack Egyptian Troops in Sinai, 
Associated Press (July 1, 2015, 5:57 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1b81eb41285047158770af1e3772aaf7/ 
militants-attack-egyptian-army-checkpoints-sinai-kill-30. 
 330. These limitations on internal resorts to force are well established in classic theory, namely in 
the works of Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf. As they posited, not every violation of the contract gives 
rise to a right of active, unlimited forcible resistance. The latter is limited by considerations of 
necessity and proportionality: the sovereign must present an extreme danger; the danger must be clear 
and manifest; and nonviolent means must be unavailable. Even in such cases, forcible action must 
abide by means-ends requirement and be justified according to a cost-benefit analysis. The latter has 
generally been disregarded in the positive international law of self-defense. Grotius, supra note 47, at 
337–38, 346–47, 356–59; Pufendorf, supra note 52, at 716–23; Vattel, supra note 48, ch. XVIII, §§ 287–
90, 292–94. 
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Phrased in this manner, we can better conceptualize the three-tiered 
approach implied by the ECtHR in Isayeva as setting forth a preliminary 
jus ad bellum requirement. 
The notions of necessity and proportionality also allow us to 
understand better the logic of the “threshold” approach prevalent in 
positive international law, which holds that during armed conflict a shift 
occurs between the law enforcement and hostilities paradigms. Only 
when confronted with a threat amounting to armed hostilities it becomes 
possible, in principle, to understand the massive violent response that 
characterizes hostilities as a web of actions in self-or-other-defense 
against ongoing and imminent threats, and to accordingly understand 
IHL as the main normative framework that governs such factual 
situations. However, by no means does IHL replace the judgment of the 
mere decision to resort to hostilities. As opposed to the “armed conflict” 
discourse discussed above, under the suggested construction, the 
existence of an armed conflict would not in itself regulate the normative 
movement between the paradigms; the latter would be subject only to 
the right to life and its exceptions. Understood this way, the relation 
between the right to life and IHL becomes parallel to that between the 
U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force and IHL. Both realms 
regulate different levels of decisionmaking and both apply 
simultaneously. If returning to the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons opinion, when 
analyzing the meaning of arbitrary deprivation of life under Article 6(1) 
of the ICCPR, we will now ask two questions: first whether the general 
decision to resort to hostilities was justified, and second whether this or 
that action was lawful under IHL. 
C. Application to Nonstate Actors 
IHRL is primarily understood as a body of law protecting 
individuals against states.331 Therefore, it is not obvious that the right to 
life, as enshrined in positive IHRL, applies also to the resort to force by 
opposition groups—which are essentially groups of individuals.332 Thus, 
in order to make the doctrine suggested here plausible, something must 
be said about human rights obligations of nonstate actors. Of course, this 
issue cannot be fully resolved here,333 but some preliminary directions can 
be offered. 
As discussed earlier, there is nothing in international law that 
inherently negates subjecting nonstate actors to any field of international 
 
 331. Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law 
38–39 (2002). 
 332. See id. at 39–46. 
 333. For a comprehensive exploration see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of 
Non-State Actors (2006); Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Philip Alston ed., 2005). 
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law, including IHRL,334 even if such actors might not be under the 
jurisdiction of this or that enforcement mechanism.335 Conceptually, just 
as nonstate actors are bound by IHL, although they do not formally enjoy 
an international legal personality, they could be bound also by IHRL 
when they exercise control, in the wide sense, over individuals.336 This is 
especially true considering that the ultimate objective of IHRL is to 
protect individuals against any source of arbitrary power, not only power 
exercised formally by states.337 
Some recent international practice supports such a view, perhaps 
stemming from an emerging customary understanding of human rights law. 
For instance, U.N. Special Rapporteur Philip Alston noted, when referring 
to the Tamil Tigers (“LTTE”) in Sri Lanka, that 
Human rights law affirms that both the [Sri Lankan] Government and 
the LTTE must respect the rights of every person in Sri Lanka. Human 
rights norms operate on three levels—as the rights of individuals, as 
obligations assumed by States, and as legitimate expectations of the 
international community. The Government has assumed the binding 
legal obligation to respect and ensure the rights recognized in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As a 
non-State actor, the LTTE does not have legal obligations under 
ICCPR, but it remains subject to the demand of the international 
community, first expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, that every organ of society respect and promote human 
rights.338 
It seems that a similar realization is behind recent U.N. Security Council 
practice, which refers to the international human rights obligations of all 
 
 334. See Yaël Ronen, Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors, 46 Cornell Int’l 
L.J. 21, 21 (2013) (noting that there is “nothing in human rights theory that precludes the imposition of 
legal obligations on actors other than states”). 
 335. Id. at 33–35. 
 336. There is at least the theoretic possibility that control, interpreted widely, is engaged when an 
individual is subject to lethal force. Human Rights Commission, General Comment 31: Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31]; see also Andreou v. 
Turkey, App. No. 45653/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 9–11 (2009). For an analysis of these questions, see Eliav 
Lieblich with Owen Alterman, Transnational Asymmetric Armed Conflict Under 
International Humanitarian Law: Key Contemporary Challenges 46–51 (2015); see also Ronen, 
supra note 334, at 26 (“There is a growing acceptance that any control may give rise to obligations, 
whether or not that control is territorial.”); cf. Zegveld, supra note 331, at 54. 
 337. Robert McCorquodale, Non-State Actors and International Human Rights Law, in Research 
Handbook on International Human Rights Law 97, 111–12 (Sarah Joseph & Adam McBeth eds., 
2010); Ronen, supra note 334, at 21 (stating that “[o]ptimally, protection of human rights should . . . 
extend to all situations in which these rights are threatened, irrespective of who puts them in 
jeopardy”). 
 338. Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), 
Mission to Sri Lanka, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5 (Mar. 27, 2006). 
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parties to internal armed conflicts,339 even if not always in specific legal 
terms.340 
Nonetheless, despite the hints of practice asserting the application 
of human rights norms to nonstate actors, a consensus remains elusive.341 
Yet still, in fact, there is ample doctrinal leeway to bring resorts to force 
by nonstate actors within the ambit of human rights law.342 Namely, 
human rights law includes a duty not only to respect, but also to act 
positively to ensure respect for human rights.343 The duty to ensure 
respect stems from the understanding that in practice, human rights can 
be violated by private individuals just as by states; its upshot being that 
states must exercise due diligence to protect individuals against 
violations of rights committed by nonstate entities.344 For all practical 
purposes, this means that the right to life, as enshrined in positive IHRL, 
applies—albeit indirectly—to acts of opposition groups. Indeed, this 
construction might have convoluted results, in which the resort to armed 
force by opposition groups, if recognized as a human rights violation, 
would result in the liability of the “victimized” state itself.345 Nonetheless, 
if in practice the due diligence requirement implies that states must react 
against violations of the right to life by nonstate actors, and if when these 
violations amount in scale and effects to armed hostilities, a strong 
defensive action might be called for, then arguably there is in fact a barrier 
imposed by human rights law on resort to hostilities by opposition groups. 
Furthermore, even if IHRL might not apply directly to nonstate 
actors, it is unclear to what extent this actually spawns significant 
 
 339. S.C. Res 2191, pmbl., ¶ 1 (Dec. 17, 2014); S.C. Res 2139, ¶ 2 (Feb. 22, 2014); see also S.C. Res. 
1265, pmbl. (Sept. 17, 1999); S.C. Res. 1193, ¶¶ 12, 14 (Aug. 28. 1998). 
 340. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2165, pmbl. (July 14, 2014) (“Strongly condemning the continuing 
widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities, as 
well as the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups.”) 
(emphasis added). But see id. ¶ 1. The tendency to view human rights obligations of nonstate actors as 
“societal expectations” rather than law in the strict sense has been evident in the international 
community’s attempts to apply human rights standards to corporations. See Ronen, supra note 334, at 24. 
 341. See Zegveld, supra note 331, at 47–51; see also McCorquodale, supra note 337, at 112–14 
(suggesting ways in which human rights law could be made applicable to nonstate actors). 
 342. For instance, human rights bodies have clarified that actions by private individuals can 
amount to “torture.” See Human Rights Committee, Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 2, at 30, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 
(1994); see also David Kretzmer, The Prohibition on Torture, Max Planck Encyclopedia on Public 
International Law ¶ 24 (2010). Similarly, it is must be true that actions by private individuals can 
amount to a violation of the right to life. 
 343. ECHR, supra note 176, art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 93, art. 2(1). 
 344. General Comment 31, supra note 336, ¶ 8. It seems that Article 17 of the ECHR, supra note 
176, goes one step further by stipulating that “[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at 
the destruction of any of the rights” protected in the Convention. For a helpful overview, see 
McCorquodale, supra note 337, at 104–09. 
 345. Cf. McCorquodale, supra note 337, at 108–09 (offering ways to ensure greater protection of 
human rights regardless of who is violator); Ronen, supra note 334, at 28. 
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consequences under positive law, at least in most cases. Let us assume 
that opposition group B resorts to force against regime A without a valid 
self-defense justification. If B loses the war, then in any case its members 
might be punished through the domestic criminal system. Of course, 
international law has no objection to such a result, since B violated the 
putative prohibition on internal force, which—at least concerning rebel 
activity—is mirrored in criminal offenses in most jurisdictions. If, 
conversely, B wins, and succeeds either in substantially taking power or 
in effecting secession, then B might incur state responsibility for actions it 
undertook while still an opposition group, including its unlawful decision 
to resort to force.346 The only scenario in which the problem of the 
attribution of responsibility remains is where A and B establish a joint 
government following the cessation of hostilities.347 
In sum, even if as of now, a formal recognition of the direct 
application of IHRL to nonstate actors remains de lege ferenda, it is 
indeed possible to envision such a regime,348 whether based on treaty 
interpretation or customary law, emanating from recent Security Council 
practice,349 or as some recent writing suggests, on models of shared 
responsibility.350 What is nonetheless clear is that ultimately, nonstate 
actors must respect the right to life, an obligation reflected—albeit 
indirectly—in states’ positive duties to protect human rights from 
violations by private individuals. Perhaps the realization that nonstate 
actors can affect the lives of millions not only by committing atrocities, 
but also by deciding to resort to hostilities, might usher a further legal 
development in this context. 
D. A System of Presumptions 
Last, it should be noted that my suggestion for an equal legal 
standard to assess resort to force both by states and opposition groups 
does not necessarily result in the absolutely identical application of the 
standard. Indeed, the problem of internal jus ad bellum is especially 
sticky because of the starting point of intrastate relations, as opposed to 
that of international relations. Since the latter presume horizontal 
“sovereign equality” between states, it is conceptually easier to identify 
illegitimate international use of force. This is because when freedom 
 
 346. This rule is entrenched in customary international law of state responsibility. See Int’l Law 
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (providing that acts of 
insurrectional movements that become governments or succeeds in establishing a new state become 
attributable to the state); see also id. at 50–52. 
 347. See id. at 51, ¶ 7. 
 348. See Ronen, supra note 334, at 25–30.  
 349. Cf. Heffes, supra note 103, at 45–52. 
 350. See Veronika Bílková, Armed Opposition Groups and Shared Responsibility, 62 Neth. Int’l 
L. Rev. 69 (2015); Jean d’Aspremont et al., Sharing Responsibility Between Non-State Actors and 
States in International Law: Introduction, 62 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 49 (2015). 
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between states is the baseline, forcible coercion clearly stands out.351 
Intrastate relations, conversely, presume coercion as a legitimate point of 
departure: states differ from one another only by the level of coercion 
they employ internally. Identifying just exactly at what point this 
coercion, or a challenge to it, amounts to the type of threat that would 
justify a forcible response is a complex factual question. 
It might be necessary, thus, as a matter of legal technique, to 
differentiate between parties through a system of presumptions. For 
instance, it could be argued that states are generally more accountable 
and possess epistemic advantages, and therefore a factual (rebuttable) 
presumption should be made in favor of governments when resorting to 
armed force.352 However, the presumption should not be too powerful, 
since we might also agree that sovereigns have a special duty of restraint 
when confronting internal resistance.353 
Moreover, this presumption can be further “tempered” by several 
flexible, fact-intensive considerations in accordance with the 
circumstances at hand. For instance, consideration can be given to the 
nature of the regime. Arguably, some weight should be given to the 
state’s overall human rights record: there is no reason that egregious 
violators of human rights would enjoy the exact same presumption as 
those that generally respect human rights. 
Of course, the exact nature of the presumption should be considered 
further. For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to point out that 
concerns that we might have regarding the implementation of the 
standard suggested here can be addressed by relatively simple legal 
techniques at the stage of application. 
Conclusion 
Given the prevalence of internal armed conflicts and their price in 
human life and security, the complex problem of internal resort to force 
cannot continue to remain a blind spot of international law. Indeed, the 
current doctrinal divergence in which external force is prohibited, while 
internal force remains all but unaddressed, is not only a peculiar moment 
in the history of international law, but is also incoherent in terms of legal 
policy. 
Since it is about killing, any legal standard regulating the resort to 
hostilities must be structured around the right of self-or-other-defense—
whether on the individual, collective or international levels. In intrastate 
 
 351. See, e.g., James N. Rosenau, Intervention as a Scientific Concept, 13 J. Conflict Resol. 149, 
163 (1969) (arguing that interstate interventions can be identified by their “convention breaking” 
nature). 
 352. For a comparable use of presumption in favor of governments in the related context of 
external assistance, see Lauterpacht, supra note 10, at 233. 
 353. Cf. Fabre, supra note 6, at 135–48 (discussing the unique devastation caused by civil wars). 
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settings, the natural normative framework for such a prohibition (and its 
exceptions) is the right to life, as entrenched in IHRL. Due to the ethical 
appeal of revisionist just war theory, this framework must apply equally 
to governments as well as to opposition groups. 
Nonetheless, the theory suggested here does not assume anarchy, on 
the one hand, nor is it conservative, on the other. It leaves space for 
second-order adjustments—in the form of factual presumptions—to give 
due consideration both to states’ duty to maintain law and order, and to 
peoples’ right to shake off oppression. But these considerations do not 
amount to a primary recognition that people, when acting through groups 
or states, are somehow permitted to kill in situations in which they would 
not be allowed to do so as individuals. 
All in all, the question of internal resort to force raises a plethora of 
problems in ethics, legal theory, doctrine and policy that should be further 
addressed. This Article, hopefully, proposes a promising baseline for 
discussion. 
